ARTICLES
TRIBAL POWERS TO REGULATE HUNTING
IN ALASKA
HEATHER NOBLE*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The controversy over state management of subsistence hunting1 is
one of Alaska's most volatile political issues. Many urban sport
hunters vehemently oppose giving subsistence hunting a priority over
sport hunting. But, if urban sport hunters are upset about state hunting management, their concern is matched by subsistence hunters' antipathy to state game regulations. Subsistence hunters residing in
remote bush villages often find the state Board of Game insensitive
and unwilling to write state game regulations adapted to their needs.
Cultural differences between sport and subsistence hunters exacerbate
the dispute, making difficult any political compromise on a single set
of hunting rules acceptable to both hunting interests. Villages, therefore, are considering writing their own tribal hunting codes. The possibility of village self-regulation, especially through tribal governments
over which non-Native sportsmen can have only indirect influence,
greatly disturbs urban sport hunters. Yet, as this article demonstrates,
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1. This article will not deal with the issue of tribal fishing regulation, which is
perhaps even more volatile. Determining whether tribal governments in Alaska can
regulate fishing involves applying the same federal Indian law legal standards applied
to hunting in this article. As this article will explain, the standards for determining
tribal jurisdiction are dependent upon several variables, including land ownership patterns, the relationship of Natives to the land where the tribally regulated activity occurs, and applicable federal statutes. Each of these factors is different for fishing than
for hunting. Due to a different land ownership pattern for navigable waters where
fishing occurs, as well as a different matrix of federal statutes regulating fishing, the
hunting analysis cannot automatically cover fishing as well.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

224

[Vol. 4:223

principles of federal Indian law authorize village tribal governments to
undertake such regulation.
This article discusses the forces driving these remote villages to
promulgate hunting codes and the legal framework surrounding the
exercise of tribal jurisdiction over hunting. Specifically, the article first
provides some factual background, describing remote villages in
Alaska and the methods by which the state Board of Game currently
writes game regulations applicable to such villages. The second section of the article briefly outlines relevant concepts of federal Indian
law used to define the place of tribal governments in the United States'
federal system. Then the discussion will turn to principles of federal
Indian law defining the territorial jurisdiction of tribes and determining whether tribal law, supported by federal law, can preempt state
law. The article will use these principles to determine whether Alaska
tribal governments can enact game codes, the extent of lands where
tribal game codes would apply, and whether such game codes would
preempt state law. The fourth and final section will discuss some policy implications of tribal game management.
II.

THE CURRENT SITUATION: REMOTE VILLAGES AND THE
STATE OF ALASKA'S PROCEDURES FOR WRITING STATE

GAME REGULATION

A.

Remote Villages in Alaska

The socioeconomic system of the approximately two hundred remote Alaska villages differs substantially from that of mainstream
American society. 2 Although each remote village is unique, all share
some generic characteristics: a strongly Native character, a mixed
subsistence-based economy deeply dependent on fish and game to meet
social and economic needs, and a complex of interlocking public gov3
erning institutions.
2. The following description is based in part on the author's first-hand knowledge of villages on the North Slope and in northwest Alaska.
3. Villages range in size from less than 100 to nearly 700. ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS, COMMUNITY/BOROUGH MAP (Jan.
1986) [hereinafter "C&RA MAP"]. This range, however, does not include the regional center towns of Barrow, Kotzebue, Nome, Bethel, and Dillingham, which have
populations from 2500 to 3500. Id. Each village has a basic infrastructure: a school,
power plant, some sort of public water supply, health clinic, post office, village public
safety office, airstrip, and at least one charch. See, e.g., R. WOLFE, J. GROSS, S.
LANGDON, J. WRIGHT, G. SHERROD, & L. ELLANNA, SUBSISTENCE-BASED ECONOMIES IN COASTAL COMMUNITIES OF SOUTHWEST ALASKA 120-56 (Alaska Department of Fish and Game ("ADF&G") Division of Subsistence Technical Paper No.
89, 1983) (community profiles of Togiak, New Stuyahok, Goodnews Bay, and Quinagak) [hereinafter SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA]. In addition, most villages
have phone service, although a few just have a single phone in the city or tribal office.
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The first shared characteristic of the remote village is its strong
Native nature, which permits Native traditions to endure. Most remote villages not accessible from the road network have a population
that is ninety to ninety-five percent Native.4 Although naive outside
observers sometimes lament the modem technology to which Native
villagers have adapted with seeming ease, the use of modem technol5
ogy masks the continuing vitality of traditional culture and values.
Another shared characteristic of the remote village is its "mixed
subsistence-based economy."' 6 In this economy, substantial fish and
game harvests are supplemented by limited participation in the cash
economy. 7 Job opportunities in villages are either short term and seasonal (for example, construction jobs on state-financed infrastructure
projects) or poorly paid (for example, cooking in the schools, working
as a part-time postmaster, or maintaining the village power plant).8 In
some regions, commercial fishing provides an alternate way to earn
substantial income without leaving the village and by using subsistence
skills. 9 In addition to paying for such basics as fuel oil and electricity,
In villages without phone service, or where phones have been recently installed, communications within the village are conducted by citizens-band radio. Every rural
community in recent years has had access to television programming through the
state's Rural Alaska Television Network. Households are fairly large, partly because
many households contain extended family members. See, e.g., Wolfe, Six Yukon River
Communities, in R. WOLFE & L. ELLANNA, RESOURCE USE AND SOCIOECONOMIC
SYSTEM: CASE STUDIES OF FISHING AND HUNTING IN ALASKA COMMUNITIES

table

11, at 32 (ADF&G Subsistence Divison Technical Paper No. 61, 1983) [hereinafter
COMPARATIVE COMMUNITY CASE STUDIES]. Housing is a mixture of structures built
by residents, and publicly subsidized "homebuyer" housing constructed by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, the Alaska State Housing Authority, or regional housing authorities. See, e.g., SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA, supra, at 122-34.
4. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AMERICAN INDIAN
AREAS AND ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: 1980 table 6, at 28-30 (1984).
5. See, e.g., D. BOERI, PEOPLE OF THE ICE WHALE (1983) (Inupiat Eskimo
whalers); R. NELSON, MAKE PRAYERS TO THE RAVEN (1983) (Koyukon Indian

hunters). The cultural changes forced upon villages in recent years is illustrated by
the fact that older residents have limited formal education and may not be fluent in
English, while many young people have finished high school and a few college. See,
e.g., SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA, supra note 3, at 570-629 (household
descriptions).
6. ADF&G

HABITAT DIVISION,

SOUTHWEST REGION

2

ALASKA HABITAT MANAGEMENT GUIDE,
SOUTHWEST HABITAT GUIDE] ("It

592 (1986) [hereinafter

costs money to engage in subsistence activities; cash outlays for hunting and fishing
equipment and supplies may be major expenses in household budgets.").
7. SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA, supra note 3, at 50-51; T. BERGER,
VILLAGE JOURNEY
8. T. BERGER,

57 (1985).
supra note 7, at 57-58;

SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA,

supra note 3, tables 21-24, at 207-15 (list of all jobs in four southwest Alaska villages).
9. See, e.g., SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA, supra note 3, at 244-310.

Trapping similarly employs subsistence skills and is locally based, but in many regions
of the state, Natives do not rely on trapping to provide a substantial income, and furs
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money is invested in gear for subsistence hunting and fishing: boats,
outboard motors, snowmachines, fishing nets, gasoline, etc.' 0 The cost
of transporting goods to the villages is extremely high, and that cost is
reflected in high village store prices." Therefore, it is more efficient to
use earned money to purchase equipment for hunting and fishing than
to buy food.
Each village follows its own "seasonal round" of subsistence activities, following a regular yearly cycle based on the local availability
of fish and game.' 2 Within the seasonal round's general pattern, the
amount of each subsistence species taken in any given year varies tremendously. This variation results from the fluctuation in the abundance and distribution of arctic fish and game and also because
weather patterns (such as the amount of snow cover or ice conditions)
may ease or block fishing and hunting access. 13 The overall village
harvest of all species is fairly level from year to year, with plentiful
species substituting for those that are scarce in a given year.' 4 To
compensate for large and unpredictable variations in individual species, the subsistence economy relies on a wide variety of fish and game,
including in the seasonal round a large proportion of all available food
species.' 5 Harvest levels, supplying most of the village's food, are
quite high - running two or three pounds a day of fish and game per
capita in many communities. 16 These traditional patterns can only
continue if villagers have unfettered access to multiple fish and game
species throughout the year.
are primarily used within the village for parkas and other traditional hunting clothing.
See, e.g., id. at 194-98.
10. Id. at 239-43.

11. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 272.7(c) (1987); SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA,
supra note 3, table 27, at 151 (almost every village has at least one store, but stores
tend to carry a limited stock of food, and sometimes they even run out of staples).
12. SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA, supra note 3, at 50.
13. ADF&G HABITAT DIVISION, 2 ALASKA HABITAT MANAGEMENT GUIDE,
ARCTIC REGION table 14, at 498 (1986) [hereinafter ARCTIC HABITAT GUIDE]; E.
BURCH, SUBSISTENCE PRODUCTION IN KIVALINA, ALASKA: A TWENTY YEAR PER-

SPECTIVE 48-49, 51, 77-78, 112-13 (ADF&G Subsistence Division Technical Paper
No. 128, 1985).
14. E. BURCH, supra note 13, at 125-26. For instance, Burch relates how in one
year a poor fall char fishery in Kivalina increased winter caribou hunting, id. at 77,
and that in another year demand for caribou was increased by poor winter seal hunt-

ing. Id. at 77-78.
15. Wolfe, UnderstandingResource Uses in Alaskan Socioeconomic Systems, in
COMPARATIVE COMMUNITY CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 261-62.
16. SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA, supra note 3, at 351-58; E. BURCH,

supra note 13, at 111 (harvest, in terms of production per capita per day, ranged from
4.6 to 6.97 pounds per person per day).
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The activities involved in producing subsistence fish and game
help to bind these small communities. People in the village join together to hunt or fish, and working groups form within the village
along lines of family or friendship. 17 Many susbsistence activities require a complex division of labor in which each group member performs a distinct task. For instance, salmon fishing may require one
person to set and pick a gillnet and others to cut the fish and hang it to
dry.18 Subsistence roles within these groups differ with sex and age,
and each person as he or she gains in age and experience assumes roles
requiring greater skill and knowledge. 19 Thus, involvement in fishing
and hunting reinforces each person's identity within the family and the
village community, and group-shared subsistence activities bind the
families and the community together. 20
In addition to these ties created by cooperation in producing subsistence foods, use and distribution of fish and game also reinforce
community ties and personal pride. Fish and game are shared according to traditional rules of fair distribution: with the production team
members, 2 1 with other extended family members, and with elders or
other disabled persons unable to fish or hunt for themselves.2 2 Thus,
distribution binds families together, creates networks reaching beyond
families throughout the village, while at the same 23time providing a
safety net for unproductive members of the village.
But subsistence hunting plays a role even more critical than providing remote villages with a viable economic base or establishing relationships among village members: it reaffirms for each hunter his
identity within his cultural tradition.2 4 With every bite of 'nigipaq'
17. E.g., SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA, supra note 3, at 387-99, 410-13;
SouTHWEST HABITAT GUIDE, supra note 6, at 590 ("Production and distribution of
subsistence products are organized to provide for household or community security
and for continued cultural existence rather than to maximize individual gain or greatest possible yield, given available labor and technology.").
18. SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA, supra note 3, at 387-99.
19. E.g., D. BOERI, supra note 5, at 21 (gaining experience and changing roles
within whaling crew).
20. SOUTHWEST HABITAT GUIDE, supra note 6, at 602-03.
21. SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA, supra note 3, at 378-429. People
working together hunting and fishing each contribute transportation equipment, gear,
and gasoline to the production group. Id.

22. Id. at 481-89 (outlines basic domestic organization).
23. Some households are much more productive than others, and in every village
a few households produce substantially greater than average harvests and distribute
the surplus to needy households. Id. at 351-57. The productive households are often,
but not always, also high income households, endowed with monetary income, subsistence equipment, and hunting expertise. Id. at 450-81.

24. T. BERGER, supra note 7, at 48-55;
6, at 603.

SOUTHWEST HABITAT GUIDE,

supra note
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(literally "real food" in Inupiaq Eskimo) - caribou, moose, seal, walrus, or whale muktuk - the hunter reassures himself and his family
that he is a worthwhile human being, a provider, a productive member
of society. In a day and age when Native American traditions are
hanging onto continued existence by a thread, when many Native
Americans are subject to rates of alcoholism, depression, and suicide
several times above the national averages, continued access to traditional game allows Alaska Natives to remember who they are and to
find self-respect in roles that make sense within their own cultural traditions rather than constantly measuring success in terms dictated by
25
mainstream American culture.
The final characteristic of the remote village is the complex of
interlocking governing institutions that such a tiny community supports. Three such institutions exist on a village level: the tribal government, municipal government, and Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act ("ANCSA")2 6 village corporation.2 7 Each operates
with a different legal base, providing varying purposes, powers, constraints, and capabilities. Although the laws governing these entities
were the product of forces outside the village, villagers have attempted
to adapt the resulting institutions to their own local needs, thereby
harnessing the powers of these institutions to shape the village's
destiny.
Typically, remote villages have two governments: a tribal government and a municipal government chartered under state law. Most
villages are incorporated as second-class cities, 28 mainly to gain access
to recently available state revenue sharing.2 9 Long before these municipalities appeared, however, the villages had tribal governments,
30
recognized by both the federal government and village residents.
Also part of this institutional complex is the ANCSA village corporation. As with all profit-seeking corporations organized under
state law, 3' the ANCSA corporation is run by a board of directors
25. SOUTHWEST HABITAT GUIDE, supra note 6, at 603.
26. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
27. Id. § 1607.
28. C&RA MAP, supra note 3.
29. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.60.350-.370 (1986 and Supp. 1987) (defines
method of disbursement of revenue from the municipal assistance funds). Tribal governments are entitled to much more limited federal funds from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs.
30. Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369, slip op. at 20-21 (D.
Alaska 1986); 51 Fed. Reg. 25118-19 (1986) (listing of Native entities within the State
of Alaska recognized and eligible to receive services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs); Op. Assoc. Solic., Div. of Indian Aft., Dep't of Interior (Oct. 1, 1980) (unpublished) (approving Village of Allakaket liquor ordinance).
31. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (1982) (regional corporation); id. § 1607(a) (village
corporation).
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elected by majority shareholder vote. Unlike most corporations, how-

ever, the shares of ANCSA village corporations are widely distributed,
being held by every Native resident alive in 1971.32 Due to this broad

distribution of ownership, ANCSA corporations often provide "pub-

lic" services to village residents. 33 In undertaking such programs, the
corporation is subject to two constraints: the threat that a shareholder
derivative suit could challenge such programs as a waste of corporate

assets; and the ultimate necessity of generating profits to underwrite
continued corporate existence. Even when engaging in purely "business" operations, the ANCSA village corporation may undertake operations which benefit the village or provide opportunities for
villagers' employment, rather than engaging in operations undertaken
34
purely for profit potential.
Regional entities also reach into the village to provide public serv-

ices. 35 Perhaps the most important of such regional institutions are
the "regional nonprofits". Their boards of directors generally are
36
made up of representatives from each tribal council in the region.
These organizations get many state and federal grants to provide so-

cial services such as village health clinics, alcohol treatment programs,
and women's shelters. In some regions, local residents have sought to

administer as many state and federal programs through the regional
nonprofit as possible, so that services will be provided by an organiza-

tion managed by Natives. 37

32. Id § 1604. Until 1991, a living shareholder cannot transfer ownership of these
shares, except pursuant to a court decree of separation, divorce, or child support, or
by a stockholder who is a member of a professional organization, association, or board
that limits the ability of that stockholder to practice his profession because of holding
stock. Id. §§ 1606(h)(1), 1607(c). Thus, almost every Native resident of the village
can vote for village corporation board of directors. Of course, real control, as in any
corporation, may rest with management.
33. T. BERGER, supra note 7, at 37.
34. ANCSA corporations began life endowed with cash and had to decide in what
business to invest. Id. at 28. Many chose to set up or buy businesses in the village,
though the opportunities for profit are often marginal there. Id. at 34. See also Chapter 11 Protection Sought by Tigara Corp., Tundra Times, Nov. 24, 1986, at 6, col. 1
(chronicling the bankruptcy of such a village corporation).
35. Some are single purpose, such as the regional school districts and regional
housing authorities, while others provide a range of services. Most villages, however,
do not lie within the boundaries of a regional borough. C&RA MAP, supra note 3.
The ANCSA regional corporations, whose shareholders consist of Alaska Natives residing in the region in 1971, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1606(g) (1982), have devoted their
resources to "public" services to varying degrees from region to region. T. BERGER,
supra note 7, at 37.
36. D. CASE, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 389-405 (1984).
37. The state has responded by requiring that all programs under state grants be
operated in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Op. Att'y Gen. No. J-66-335-81, at 4-5
(Apr. 27, 1981). Many federal programs require discrimination between tribal members and nontribal members, and are to be operated with "Indian hire." See, e.g.,
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Alaska's remote village is a community with unique characteristics. Its mixed subsistence-based economy differs substantially from
that of mainstream American society. Village residents want to protect and maintain this economy, because it provides them not only
with "nigipaq," but also with traditional identities for self and family.
Villagers try to use a complex of governing institutions to maintain
local control and to avoid being overwhelmed by the needs, desires,
and even the whims and fancies of an alien mainstream society.
B.

Myths and Realities of State Game Management
in Remote Villages

1. Federaland State Game Management Systems. Game management traditionally has been the province of state governments, rooted
in the legal fiction that the sovereign owns the wild fish and game
within its borders.38 In Alaska, more so than in most states, however,
many game resources are subject, at least in part, to management by
entities other than the Alaska Department of Fish and Game
("ADF&G"). Certain species, including whales, seals, walrus, sea otter, polar bears, and migratory birds, are federally managed due to
treaty commitments of the United States. 39 Further, federal land
management agencies in charge of units established in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA") 40 have the responsibility to assure that hunting regulations applicable to those units
are compatible with the purposes for which those lands were set
aside.4 1 The National Park Service and Fish and Wildlife Service
have, however, decreed in their regulations that state game law applies
on the Alaska National Parks, Preserves, Monuments, and Wildlife
42
Refuges managed by these two agencies.
Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v. Pierce, 694 F.2d
1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1982) (federal Indian housing regulation that gives preference in
the awarding of contracts to Indian-owned businesses does not violate equal protection standards).
38. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Montana Dep't of Fish and Game, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
39. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
40. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2374 (1980).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 431 note (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (national parks, preserves, and
monuments managed by National Park Service); 16 U.S.C. § 668dd note (1982) (national wildlife refuges managed by Fish and Wildlife Service). Hunting is allowed on
all wildlife refuge lands, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and on national preserves, 16 U.S.C. § 410hh-2 (1982). Subsistence hunting is authorized in
almost all of the national parks and monuments in Alaska. Id.
42. 36 C.F.R. § 13.40(e) (1986) (National Park Service); 50 C.F.R. § 36.11(d)
(1986) (Fish and Wildlife Service).
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In addition, federal law places restrictions on the way that the
State of Alaska can manage game throughout the state.4 3 For the pur-

poses of this article, the most important such federal requirements
deal with the procedures for writing state hunting regulations. Section
805 of ANILCA requires the state to implement a system of local fish
44
and game advisory committees and regional advisory councils.
Under this federal statute the regional advisory councils' powers surpass merely tendering advice. They are to make annual recommendations for managing wildlife populations, 45 which the Board of Game
can only overrule if they "[are] not supported by substantial evidence
presented during the course of its administrative proceedings, violate[ ] recognized principles of... wildlife conservation or would be
detrimental to the satisfaction of rural subsistence needs."' 46 Thus,
section 805 seeks to assure that state hunting regulations are sensitive

to local subsistence needs by establishing procedures for regulations to
be written by councils of local residents, with supervision by the Board
of Game only as necessary to assure that the regulations are consistent
with the conservation of game.
The legislative history of title VIII of ANILCA underscores the

fact that the regional councils would have more than an advisory role.
43. Title VIII of ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3111-3126 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), provides a variety of protections for subsistence. See, e.g., Village of Gambell v. Clark,
746 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Village of Gambell, - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1396 (1987), including requirements for
state management of fish and game. Under title VIII of ANILCA, the state can regulate hunting and fishing on federal lands only if certain requirements are met. 16
U.S.C. § 3115(d) (1982). If the state is not in compliance with these requirements,
ADF&G would be unable to manage fish and game resources on federal lands comprising over half of the lands in Alaska. Among these measures is the infamous "subsistence priority" which has stirred so much protest among some sport hunters. Id.
§ 3114 ("The taking on public lands of fish and wildlife for nonwasteful subsistence
uses shall be accorded priority over the taking on such lands of fish and wildlife for
other purposes.").
44. 16 U.S.C. § 3115 (1982) (requires the Secretary of the Interior to establish
regional councils but provides that if the state enacts laws of general applicability
consistent with the other provisions of title VIII, such state law shall supersede federal
law).
45. Id. § 3115(a)(3)(D). Regional council annual reports are to contain an identification of current and anticipated regional subsistence uses, an evaluation of subsistence needs, a strategy for management of wildlife populations to accommodate
subsistence uses and needs, and recommended regulations to implement the strategy.
Id. The councils must be provided "adequate qualified staff" and copies of "all available technical and scientific support data." Id. § 3115(b). Local fish and game advisory committees are to assist and provide advice to the regional councils. Id.
§ 3115(a)(3)(D)(iv).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 3115(d) (1982). If the Board of Game turns down a regional
advisory council proposal, the Board "shall set forth the factual basis and the reasons
for its decision." Id.
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Title VIII was enacted to change the status quo, which Congress
found gave rural residents too little input into subsistence management. 47 In title VIII, Congress included a finding that to protect subsistence "an administrative structure [must] be established for the

purpose of enabling rural residents who have personal knowledge of
local conditions and requirements to have a meaningful role in the
' '48

management of... subsistence uses on the public lands in Alaska.

Congress made a deliberate choice to give regional councils more than

an advisory role. The House rejected two earlier versions
of the bill in
49
which the councils' powers were merely advisory.

The State of Alaska has not implemented these federal procedural
requirements entirely faithfully. Divergence from ANILCA's man-

date begins subtly in state law. 50 State regulations 51 authorizing re-

gional councils do mention that the councils can produce an annual
report containing a recommended strategy for the management of fish
47. Congressman Udall, one of the principal authors and supporters of ANILCA,
explained on the floor of the House why the subsistence subchapter of ANILCA was
necessary:
In 1971, the Congress, in the conference report on the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, instructed both the Secretary of the Interior and the State of
Alaska: "to take any action necessary to protect the subsistence needs of the
(Alaska) Natives."
The responsibility was accepted by the Secretary and the State in exchange for the exclusion from that act of a subsistence management title
developed by the Senate.
Both the State and the Secretary have been reluctant ...

to provide

rural people with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the management and regulation of subsistence resources in their local area.
[W]e promised [Alaska's rural Native people] that we would work to
try to achieve legislation which would include a subsistence management
process to insure meaningful participation by rural people in decisions of
both the State and Federal governments which so effect [sic] their culture
and their lives ....
125 CONG. REC. 9904 (1979) (quoting H.R. CONE. Rap. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
37, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2247, 2250).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(5) (1982) (emphasis added).
49. Congressman Grudger criticized the Breaux-Dingell bill, one of the two bills
rejected by the House, because:
regional boards established pursuant to the Breaux-Dingell bill will be totally advisory in nature, a major compromise in the commitment of this
body last year to provide rural people with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process which is critical to the survival of
their culture and subsistence way of life.
125 CONG. REc. 11,428 (1979).

The House adopted the Udall-Anderson substitute bill, rather than the BreauxDingell bill. See 125 CONG. REC. 11,458 (1979).
50. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.260 (1987). For a discussion of the compatibility of
state local participation law with local participation standard of ANILCA, see 1981

Op. Att'y Gen. No. 11.
51. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5,

§ 96.200 (Oct. 1983).
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and wildlife populations. 52 No provision of state law, however, recognizes the power of a regional council to write regulations in annual
reports, subject only to limited review by the Board of Game. Rather,
the regulations contemplate a much more limited, and entirely advisory, role for the regional councils, authorizing each council "in its
discretion" to present regulatory recommendations to the Board of
Game. 3 Thus, the state regulations vary significantly from section
805 in the role they grant to regional councils.
2. Operationof Councils and the Board of Game. Divergence from
the requirements of section 805 has been especially striking in the operation of regional councils. ADF&G has told regional council members that their actual powers, like the powers of local committees,
consist only of giving advice to the Board of Game.5 4 The annual reports required by section 805 have not been produced by the regional
councils."5 The regional councils, made up of representatives from remote villages, 56 have generally been able to convene for a single day
52. Id. § 96.250(a)(5)(C) (Sept. 1985). ANILCA designed regional councils to be
institutions concerned with subsistence needs only. Under federal law their annual
reports are to focus upon such needs and designing regnlations to meet those needs.
See supra note 45. The state regulations, by contrast, require the regional councils to
consider and recommend strategies to accommodate subsistence uses "and other fish
and wildlife uses." ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 96.250(a)(5) (Sept. 1985). The
manual distributed to advisory committee members also directs the committees to fill
their membership with representatives of "at least three user groups (i.e., commercial
fishermen, trappers, sport fishermen, subsistence users, processors, photographers,
etc.)." ADF&G, ADVISORY COMMIrrEE MANUAL 10 (1983). In ANILCA, the regional council system was to be a bulwark to give subsistence needs primary consideration in the regulatory process. The state regulations convert the regional council
system into another forum to mediate allocation of game between subsistence and
other users.
53. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 96.250(c) (Sept. 1985).
54. ADVISORY COMMITEE MANUAL, supra note 52, at 8, 12. The Manual emphasizes that committees and councils are avenues for providing information to the
Board about public concerns, so that the Board can write regulations. "Board members want to hear what happened at the committee meeting during discussion of a
particular issue, and what the public opinions expressed were. This is the kind of
information that is most helpful to board members in helping them make their decisions." Id. at 11.
55. See, e.g., Minutes of South Central Regional Fish & Game Council at 10 (Jan.
31, 1987). The advisory committee manual directs each council to produce such a
report, saying that Department staff can provide data and technical support "but the
report itself must be written by the council." ADVISORY COMMITTEE MANUAL,
supra note 52, at 13.
56. The Arctic Regional Council, for instance, is made up of representatives from
all across northern and western Alaska, from the Beaufort Sea coast to the Seward
Peninsula. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 96.021(c)(5) (Aug. 1986).
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meeting once a year.57 Lack of travel funds and support staff to coor-

dinate meetings preclude more extensive or frequent meetings.5 8 Such

limited meetings are not adequate to permit the councils to write or
revise game regulations for each region, to evaluate subsistence needs,
or to devise a strategy for meeting subsistence needs in an annual report.59 The timing of the meetings also indicates that the state does

not intend the regional councils to draft proposed regulations for review by the Board of Game. Meetings are scheduled to occur after
printing the booklet that contains proposed game regulation changes
to be considered at the Board of Game meeting6 ° The purpose of

these meetings is to permit the regional councils to comment on regulatory proposals produced by other parties, not independently to draft

game regulations.6 1 Any proposals created by the regional councils at
these meetings could not be circulated for public comment in compliance with the State Administrative Procedures Act. 62 Thus, barring an

emergency justifying enacting such proposals, the Board of Game
63
would not consider such regional council proposals.
This failure of the State of Alaska to permit the regional councils

to fulffil their role under section 805 would not matter if the local
57. See, ag., Minutes of Interior Regional Fish & Game Council (Mar. 31, 1987);
Minutes of Arctic Regional Fish & Game Council (Feb. 6, 1987); Minutes of
Southcentral Regional Fish & Game Council (Jan. 31, 1987); Minutes of Southwest
Regional Fish & Game Council (Nov. 22, 1986). But see Minutes of Southeast Regional Fish & Game Council (Jan. 15, 1987), (Mar. 13, 1987) & (Apr. 15, 1987). The
Arctic Regional Council did not meet at all in 1986. Minutes of Arctic Regional Fish
& Game Council at 9 (Feb. 6, 1987).
58. Telephone interview with Beth Stewart, Division of Boards, ADF&G (1986).
59. Cf 16 U.S.C. § 3115(a)(3)(D) (1982).
60. Telephone interview with Bob Larson, Division of Boards, ADF&G (Sept. 11,
1987).
61. For instance, for the spring Board of Game meeting in 1987, none of the 247
proposals on the Board's agenda was introduced by a regional council. Before that
Board of Game meeting, two regional councils each took action supporting a proposal
from an advisory comittee and a village tribal council respectively. Unapproved Minutes of Interior Regional Fish & Game Council at 2 (Mar. 31, 1987) (petition by Ruby
Advisory Committee to stop decline of moose); Minutes of Arctic Regional Fish &
Game Council at 9 (Feb. 6, 1987) (Noatak Traditional Council proposal to form
Noatak Controlled Use Area). Neither proposal made it onto the Board's agenda.
Telephone interview with Bob Larson, Division of Boards (Sept. 11, 1987). One was
denied because it raised issues regarding aerial wolf control that were previously decided by the Board, it was not supported by new evidence, and it required changes to
predation control regulations. Id.; see also Letter from Bob Larson, Division of
Boards to Royce Purinton, Chairman, Interior Regulatory Council (June 12, 1987).
The other was deferred for consideration to the spring of 1988. Telephone interview
with Bob Larson, Division of Boards (Sept. 11, 1987); Letter from Bob Larson, Division of Boards to Weaver Ivanoff, Arctic Regional Council (Sept. 8, 1987).
62. Telephone interview with Bob Larson, Division of Boards (Sept. 11, 1987).
63. Id.
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advisory committees were actively creating regulatory proposals regularly accepted by the Board of Game. The advisory committees, however, are having mixed results participating in the process of creating
regulations. Some local committees, especially those with members
from several remote villages, have met sporadically." 4 The Board of

Game has not routinely approved of regulatory proposals coming
65

from advisory committees.
Game regulations, rather than being produced by the regional
councils, are passed into law by the Board of Game. The group that
appears to have the most influence with the Board of Game, based on
the frequency with which its proposals are accepted, is the staff of the
Game Division.6 6 This influence of the Game Division has not produced regulations overly sensitive to subsistence hunters' needs. The
Game Division formerly was a strong advocate in favor of sport hunting interests and against subsistence.67 In the last few years, however,
the Division has developed a policy of avoiding taking stands on how
game will be allocated among users, sticking solely to the biological
issues of ensuring healthy game populations. 68 This studied neutrality
does not, however, ensure that Game Division proposals will necessarily lead to game regulations suited to village needs. Game Division
biologists do not generally have any training in anthropology or other
social sciences, nor any knowledge of the very different hunting values
64. For instance, in the NANA region of northwest Alaska, the Kotzebue Fish
and Game Advisory Committee, made up almost entirely of members of Kotzebue,
has met approximately once a month in 1986, while the region's other advisory committees, which all have membership shared between at least two villages, have met
perhaps once a year. Interview with Victor Karmun, Arctic Region Fish and Game
Advisory Committee Coordinator, ADF&G (1986).
65. At the 1987 spring Board of Game meeting, for instance, approximately 25%
of proposals from advisory committees were enacted by the Board of Game. Compare
Packet of Regulatory Proposals for March/April 1987 Board of Game Meeting with
Alaska Game Regulations No. 28 (effective July 19, 1987-June 30, 1988). Committee
proposals did fare better than proposals from individuals or special interest groups, of
which only about five percent were adopted. Compare Packet of Regulatory Proposals for Mar./Apr. 1987 Board of Game Meeting with Alaska Game Regulations No.
28 (effective July 19, 1987-June 30, 1988).
66. Well over half of the proposals from Fish & Game staff at the 1987 spring
Board of Game meeting were implemented with little or no modification. Id.
67. Interview with Greg Moore, Instructor, Chukehi Community College,
Kotzebue, (1986). Anti-subsistence gubernatorial candidate Ron Somerville is a former head of the Game Division. Compare Packet of Regulatory Proposals for
March/April 1987 Board of Game Meeting with Alaska Game Regulations No. 28
(effective July 19, 1987-June 30, 1988).
68. Telephone interview with Steve Behnke, Subsistence Division, ADF&G (Sept.
11, 1987). In addition, Game Division will not make a proposal to the Board of Game
when a proposal on the same topic is coming to the Board from an individual, group,
or advisory committee. See Packet of Regulatory Proposals for March/April 1987
Board of Game Meeting, supra note 65, passim.
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of Alaska Native cultural traditions. 69 Thus, these biologists are illprepared to understand the needs and values of subsistence hunters.
Nor are Board of Game meetings structured to facilitate input
from subsistence hunters. 70 Meetings are held in urban centers such
as Anchorage or Juneau and often go on for weeks, 7 1 the Board considering hundreds of proposals to change regulations in different areas
of the state. 72 The agenda is not organized in such a way that the

public can know ahead of time when the Board will consider a specific

proposal. 73 Even advisory committee chairmen, whom the state can
pay a per diem to attend Board of Game meetings, have difficulty
spending weeks waiting for the Board to discuss regulatory changes in
their region. 74 In recent years, however, advisory committee representatives have been attending Board of Game meetings with increasing
frequency and have been achieving some influence with the Board of
75
Game.

Basically, it is very difficult for the Board of Game to create regulations suited to subsistence hunters' needs. A board setting rules

statewide inherently will be less sensitive to local values, local needs,
69. The Subsistence Division has begun to deal with this deficiency with a crosscultural training program for other ADF&G staff. Telephone interview with Robert
Schroeder, Subsistence Division, ADF&G (1986).
70. Subsistence Division personnel do attend the meetings and provide anthropological information on subsistence uses and needs. For many proposals, Subsistence
Division may not be able to provide the Board with information to assess the impact
of the regulatory change on villagers. Subsistence Division research projects, however, are seldom so narrowly focused as to provide information that would assist the
Board in selecting one regulatory proposal over another, regarding proper methods
and means of hunting, seasons, or bag limits. Due to the dearth of basic research
about subsistence, Subsistence Division has had its hands full developing basic information such as that presented in the description of remote villages. See supra notes 426 (sociological data). Just as Game Division avoids taking positions on allocation
questions, Subsistence Division does not advocate for subsistence interests. Rather,
Subsistence Division presents the Board with whatever anthropological information
on subsistence uses that the Division can provide. Telephone interview with Steve
Behnke, Subsistence Division, ADF&G (Sept. 11, 1987).
71. The spring meeting of the Board of Game in 1987 lasted from March 30 to
April 15. Telephone interview with Bob Larson, Division of Boards (Sept. 11, 1987).
72. At the March/April 1987 Board of Game meeting, held at the Anchorage
Westward Hilton Hotel, the Board considered 193 separate proposals to alter game
regulations. Packet of Regulatory Proposals for March/April 1987 Board of Game
Meeting, supra note 65.
73. The Division of Boards has a phone number with a recorded message during
the Board meeting with current updates on the Board's agenda. Id., Cover Letter to
Reviewers.
74. Interview with Calvin Moto, former Chairman, Arctic Regional Fish and
Game Council (1986).
75. Telephone interview with Steve Behnke, Subsistence Division, ADF&G (Sept.
11, 1987).
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and local conditions, than a regional or local decision-making body. 76
In those rare circumstances when an advisory committee, Subsistence
Division, and Game Division can reach consensus on a proposal, the
Board of Game is extremely likely to accept their recommendations,
unless some other group objects. 77 For all the reasons discussed
above, however, when the Board of Game considers proposals to
change game regulations, the Board thus often does not have adequate
information about subsistence hunting practices, needs, and values. It
is no surprise, therefore, that the Board fails to write regulations responsive to village needs. 7 8 Nor is it astonishing that village hunters
79
react to these hunting regulations with widespread noncompliance.
3. Enforcement of Game Regulations. In part, village hunters'
noncompliance with state game regulations is the state's fault, since
the state fails to communicate its legal requirements to villagers in
understandable form. Game regulations are distributed to hunters in a
booklet which includes seasons, bag limits, permitting and tagging
requirements for all hunts in the state, as well as special use restrictions and general applicable regulations setting out allowable methods
and means of hunting.8 0 In recent years this booklet has run about
one hundred pages in length. 8 1 This booklet is overly long and com-

plex - even a lawyer has difficulty finding in it all regulations applica-

ble to a particular hunt.82 The language of many regulations is

76. State regulations on such issues as legal methods and means of hunting mostly
apply statewide, with some local exceptions. Thus, it is difficult for the Board of
Game to tailor methods and means regulations to track the traditional methods and
means of hunting in various Native traditions around the state.
77. Telephone interview with Steve Behnke, Subsistence Division, ADF&G (Sept.
11, 1987).
78. T. BERGER, supra note 7, at 59-60.
79. Id. at 65 ("When a law stands between the Natives and their resources, when
it does not take basic economic realities into account, when it conflicts with Native
principles or beliefs, compliance with the law is low.").
80. See, e.g., Alaska State Game Regulations No. 28 (effective July 1, 1987 to
June 30, 1988) [hereinafter Regulations No. 28].
81. See, e.g., Alaska State Game Regulations No. 26 (effective July 2, 1985-June
30, 1986) (107 pages). For 1987-88 ADF&G increased the page size, reduced the
typeface, and managed to produce a booklet of 48 pages. Regulations No. 28, supra
note 80.
82. For instance, this complexity can be illustrated through a description of all
game regulations applicable to a subsistence caribou hunt by a local resident in Game
Management Unit 23 in Northwest Alaska. Seasons, bag limits, sex restrictions, and
transport restrictions south of the Yukon River are listed in one section of the Game
Regulation booklet. Regulations No. 28, supra note 80, at 28. In another section the
hunter can ascertain that there are no special use restrictions in Game Management
Unit 23. Id. at 27. The fees and requirements for a hunting license are listed at the
beginning of the booklet along with the exceptions for Alaska residents over 60 and
under 16 and disabled veterans. Id. at 2-3. The hunter is required to be "registered to
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ambiguous, 8 3 yet hunters are held strictly liable for game violations 8 4
hunt caribou in Northwest Alaska or [have] an Arctic caribou harvest report."
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.010 (July 1985), reprinted in Regulations No. 28,
supra note 80, at 4. Weaponry which can be used to take big game are listed in a
regulation titled "Lawful Methods and Means of Taking Game." ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. 5, § 92.075 (June 1986), reprintedin Regulations No. 28, supra note 80, at 6.
The hunter can only determine that caribou are included in the term "big game" by
referring to another regulation, which is listed on a different page of the booklet.
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.990 (July 1986) (definitions), reprintedin Regulations No. 28, supra note 80, at 9. Only in Game Management Unit 23 can "a motor
driven boat be used to take caribou," ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.080(4) (June
1986), reprinted in Regulations No. 28, supra note 80, at 6, and caribou can be taken
while swimming. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.085(3) (July 1985), reprinted in
Regulations No. 28, supra note 80, at 6. Caribou, however, cannot be taken "from
any mechanical vehicle," id., or "with the use of an aircraft, snowmachine, motordriven boat, or other motorized vehicle for the purpose of driving, herding, or molesting game." ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.080(5) (June 1986), reprinted in
Regulations No. 28, supra note 80, at 6. The complex and confusing language used to
bar hunting the same day a hunter is airborne should not concern a subsistence hunter
unlikely to have access to air transportation. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5,
§ 92.085(4) (July 1985), reprinted in Regulations No. 28, supra note 80, at 6. The
regulation governing purchase and sale of game reads:
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section, the purchase, sale, or barter of
game or parts of game is permitted.
(b) Except as provided in [ALASKA STAT. § ] 16.05.930(e) [relating to the
barter of subsistence taken game], no person may purchase, sell, or barter
the following:
(1) the meat of big game ...however, caribou may be bartered in
units 22-26 but such bartered caribou may not be transported or
exported from those units ....
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.200 (Oct. 1985), reprinted in Regulations No. 28,
supra note 80, at 7-8. Tucked into a regulation titled "Salvage of Game Meat, Furs,
and Hides" is a requirement that caribou meat in this unit "must be removed immediately from the field." ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.220(c) (July 1985), reprinted
in Regulations No. 28, supra note 80, at 8. The term "meat" is not defined, although
"edible meat" is. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.990(14) (July 1986), reprintedin
Regulations No. 28, supra note 80, at 9. Salvage requirements for meat are contained

in state statutes, which are briefly described but not reprinted in the game booklet. Id.
at 10. Some of these salvage requirements apply to caribou. Id.
83. See generally P. SCHAEFFER, D. BARR, & G. MOORE, KOTZEBUE FISH AND
GAME ADVISORY COMMITTEE REGULATION REVIEW: A REVIEW OF THE GAME

REGULATIONS AFFECTING NORTHWEST ALASKA (1986) [hereinafter REGULATION
REVIEW]. One instance is the regulation makes it illegal to use a snowmachine for the
purpose of "driving, herding, or molesting game." Id. at 16 (criticizing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.080(5) (June 1986)). If a hunter driving a snowmachine across
the tundra encounters a group of caribou and they, startled by the machine, begin
running, under what circumstances can the hunter attempt to take a caribou from the

group? Can the hunter continue driving if the caribou start running in the same direction as the snowmachine or must he stop his machine?
84. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.002 (July 1985) ("Unless otherwise provided in [ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, §§ ] 78-92, or in [ALASKA STAT. § ] 16, [a
person who violates a provision of ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, §§ 78-92] is strictly
liable for the offense, regardless of the person's intent."). This regulation overturns
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Many subsistence hunters have limited formal schooling and cannot
understand the regulations as presented in this booklet.8 5 Another

problem is that village fee agents selling hunting
licenses often do not
86

get enough booklets to distribute to hunters.
Many subsistence hunters, even if they know the requirements of
state law, do not follow regulations that to them make no sense.8 7 In-

stead, they comply with the conventional law of their cultural tradi-

tion. s8 Residents of remote villages hold shared values and
expectations, rooted in their Native cultural tradition, about what is
"good hunting" and what is "bad hunting."8' 9 Hunters who do not
live up to the community's expectations suffer the disapprobation of
State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981), which held that "fish and game regulations
are not necessarily by their very nature immune from the requirement of mens rea."
Id. at 108.
85. The author is acquainted with one subsistence hunter who always carries a
copy of the game regulation booklet in his parka pocket when hunting, though he is
illiterate.
86. REGULATION REviEw, supra note 83, at 4.
87. See, e.g., REGULATION REVIEW, supra note 83, at 15 (regulations ban rimfire
but allow semi-automatic centerfire weapons); id. at 23-24 (regulations ban traditional
Inupiaq practice of cacheing meat to cure in the field but have no provisions to deal
with sport hunters who choose to camp next to the kill and fail to take measures to
preserve meat and thereby allow spoilage). Probably the most pervasive way in which
state game regulations fail to adapt to subsistence hunters' needs is in the regulations'
use of individual bag limits. A variety of factors make individual bag limits inappropriate for subsistence management. As has been mentioned previously, a few hunters
in each village are extremely productive and share their take, thereby supporting other
households. See supra note 23. In addition, the fluctuations of the seasonal round
result in the village depending heavily on one resource, such as caribou, in one year
while enjoying plenty of another resource, such as seals, in another year. See supra
note 14. It is the overall village take of game that remains steady. See supra note 14.
Given these patterns, only limits on take at the village level would meet subsistence
hunters' needs. Yet the state refuses to enact village bag limits. See Second Amended
and Supplemental Complaint at 8-9, Bobby v. Alaska (D. Alaska Oct. 15, 1985) (No.
A84-544).
88. T. BERGER, supra note 7, at 65-66. Greg Moore describes a paradigmatic
caribou hunt in Northwest Alaska which, although sound with respect to conservation of game resources, involves literally dozens of violations of state game regulations: hunters failing to bring along their wallets containing their hunting licenses (to
avoid losing their wallets), shooting caribou while resting the gun on the seat of a
snowmachine (the firmest and most reliable base for a shot in the entire snow covered
landscape), giving caribou to elders in the village, and one elder choosing voluntarily
to reciprocate by underwriting a hunter's gasoline costs. G. MOORE, A REVIEW OF
GAME MANAGEMENT IN NORTHWEST ALASKA 10-11 (1984).
89. T. BERGER, supra note 7, at 59; R. NELSON, supra note 5, at 14-32 (1983); J.
MAGDANZ & A. OLANNA, CONTROLS ON FISHING BEHAVIOR ON THE NOME RIVER
60-81 (ADF&G Subsistence Division Technical Paper No. 102, 1984). As one anthropologist has put it, in spite of the insecurity inherent in annual fluctuations and village
lack of control over the supply of game, "[i]t
does not follow... that Native hunters
kill everything they can get their hands on." E. BURCH, supra note 13, at 116.
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their fellows. 90 In communities as tightly knit as these villages, where
each household relies on sharing with others to get through lean times,
such peer pressure can be powerful stuff. Since these values are shared
norms within a definable society, and since the society imposes penalties for transgressions of the norms, the normative system constitutes a
system of law. 9 1 It has not been generally recognized as such, due to
its unwritten nature and non-institutionalized methods of implementation. Nonetheless, it fulfills the function of a legal system within the
village,92 and is far more effective for insuring hunting behavior acceptable to that community than most urban outsiders can imagine.
Since there are few or no state or federal enforcement personnel
in many remote areas of Alaska, 93 subsistence hunters can continue to
hunt under their traditional law rather than under state regulations.
Occasionally, a village hunter is prosecuted. If his game violation does
not violate the village's traditional law, however, his peers in the village feel that he is being unjustly persecuted, and they may fail to
94
cooperate with state enforcement personnel.
Game violations by subsistence hunters are of two types: (1) substantive, where hunters engage in hunting practices allowed or even
preferred under traditional law but illegal under state law; and (2) procedural, where hunters fail to comply with state paperwork requirements for licenses, permits, tags, and so on. The second type of
violation is more pervasive than the first, 95 because reporting requirements are especially incomprehensible to subsistence hunters operating in an unwritten, non-mathematical cultural tradition. Subsistence
hunters track the health of game populations by observing animals on
the land. 9 6 They find strange the very different methods used by game
biologists. In many rural areas, state game biologists know better than
90. J. MAGDANZ & A. OLANNA, supra note 89, at 81-84, 90-91, 94-102.
91. Cf C.

WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW

(1987).
92. Cf K. LLEWELLYN & E.

HOEBEL,

69 n.88

THE CHEYENNE WAY 273-89 (1941).

93. For instance, in 1986 there were no enforcement personnel devoted exclusively to fish and game enforcement in either the NANA region or the North Slope in those regions game enforcement is undertaken by state troopers with many other
responsibilities. Interview with David James, Area Game Biologist, Kotzebue,
ADF&G (1986).
94. E.g., Frustrationand Anger in the Village of Togiak, Tundra Times, Apr. 7,
1986, at 1, col. I. Outsiders, ignorant of traditional village law, portray such actions
as outrageous "poaching." Cf PoachersDecimate Caribou, Anchorage Daily News,

Mar. 27, 1986, at Al, col. 1 (reporting same incident).
95. REGULATION REVIEW, supra note 83, at 12-14.
96. H. BRODY, MAPS AND DREAMS, 37, 39 (1981); E. BURCH, supra note 13, at
13 ("Natives, particularly those who are active hunters themselves, regularly monitor

the general harvest on at least a daily basis.").
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to rely on reported information from hunters in managing game popu-

lations, because such information grossly undercounts the subsistence
take. To collect accurate information in subsistence take, ADF&G

must use other methods,
all requiring the cooperation of subsistence
97
hunters for accuracy.

The result is a situation of only nominal state game "management." In fact, traditional law and controls on hunters internal to the

villages are important factors in game management in remote areas,
and village cooperation in providing information is crucial for the

state even to monitor what is going on. Since the traditional law system, however, does not rely on institutional mechanisms recognizable

to state policy-makers, the operation of this system is not generally
acknowledged.

Village hunters do not like to hunt in violation of state game regu-

lations, in spite of low risk of prosecution. It makes them nervous. 98
They want either to change state game regulations to conform more

closely with their own traditions, 99 or to get out of the state regulatory

system altogether. In order to escape state regulation, some villages
are exploring the possibility of writing their own game codes in tribal
law, thereby preempting the operation of state law. The remainder of
this article will discuss the legal feasibility of such efforts.
III. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW PRINCIPLES DEFINING THE ROLE OF
TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS

The doctrines contained in the field of federal Indian law define
the place and the powers of tribal governments within our federal system. Although some, particularly the State of Alaska, question the
applicability of these doctrines to Alaska Natives, 10 the courts in the
97. REGULATION REVIEW, supra note 83, at 14. Under the standards of Native
traditional belief systems, biologists' methods of monitoring game populations may
even be harmful to animals. See, e.g., J. MAGDANZ & A. OLANNA, supra note 89, at
57; R. NELSON, supra note 5, at 210.
98. If they know that enforcement personnel might be in the area, some hunters
will stop all hunting rather than risk inadvertently violating some regulation of which
they are ignorant. For instance, in early 1986, after the National Park Service charged
Clement Downey with hunting sheep without a registration permit in Noatak National Preserve, some hunters in Kiana stopped hunting in Kobuk Valley National
Park out of fear that they too would be prosecuted by Park Service. Interview with
residents of Kiana (1986). By contrast, hunters in the neighboring village of Noatak
continued to hunt sheep in Noatak National Preserve without registration permits, in
spite of Park Service enforcement efforts. Interview with residents of Noatak (1986).
99. REGULATION REVIEW, supra note 83, passim.
100. See, e.g., Defendant State of Alaska's Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Dismiss at 31-32 n.18, Akiachak v. Notti (D. Alaska July 16, 1986) (Civ.
No. A85-503) (Native villages are not tribes); Brief of Appellate State of Alaska in
Response to Brief of Amicus Curiae at 11-20, Circle Village Council v. Alaska, Dept.
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modem era have analyzed the position of Alaska Natives and of their
tribal governments using the same principles applied to Indians and
tribes in the lower forty-eight states. 0 1 Therefore, this section discusses the relevant federal Indian law doctrines and their application
to the question of whether tribes can exercise jurisdiction over hunting
on certain lands in Alaska. Specifically, this section begins with a brief
introduction to federal Indian law, discussing, as it must, three bedrock John Marshall decisions, which the Chief Justice handed down in
the earliest decade of our republic. These decisions set forth the principles of the rule of discovery, doctrine of aboriginal title, and federal
trust responsibility, all of which have historical importance and, more
importantly for the purposes of this article, are doctrines that the
United States Supreme Court continues to draw on in deciding jurisdictional disputes between states and Native Americans. After setting
forth these general principles, section IV focuses on two inquiries:
first, whether ANCSA village corporation lands are Indian country;
second, whether the tribes can invoke the doctrine of preemption to
support their ability to exert exclusive tribal jurisdiction over these
ANCSA lands.
A.

The Rule of Discovery and the Doctrine of Aboriginal Title

The first Indian law decision handed down by Chief Justice John
Marshall concerned Indian property rights. In this case, Johnson v.
M'Intosh,10 2 the Chief Justice laid out the unique property rights applicable to lands occupied by Indians from time immemorial. Thus,
the case makes it clear that Indians hold a unique status and that these
aboriginal people would not be governed by the same rules as settlers
from the Old World and their descendents. This 1828 decision lays
out two related concepts - the rule of discovery and the doctrine of
aboriginaltitle - which define the respective land rights of Native
American occupants and settlers from the Old World. 0 3 The case
arose when an Indian tribe sold some of its traditional lands to a settler and then later ceded the same lands to the federal government by
of Community & Regional Affairs (Alaska Nov. 14, 1986) (No. S 1572) (case law has
never recognized Indian country in Alaska).
101. People of Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1979) (Alaska
Natives are entitled to protections of federal trust responsibility); Eric v. United States
Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 464 F. Supp. 44 (D. Alaska 1978) (Alaska Natives
are entitled to protections of federal trust responsibility); Native Village of Tyonek v.
Puckett, No. A82-369, slip op. at 20-21 (D. Alaska Dec. 3, 1986) (tribal governments
in Alaska villages entitled to same sovereign immunity as Indian tribes in the lower

forty-eight states).
102. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
103. Id. at 588-92.
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treaty. 104 After the federal government sold its interest, this quiet title
action sought to resolve competing claims to the lands. One claimant's title traced back to the tribe's direct sale to the settler. 10 5 The
other party held title originating
in federal patent after Indian treaty
10 6
cession to the United States.
M'Intosh held that the Indians had an interest in lands they traditionally occupied, but that their interest was less than fee simple.10 7 In
analyzing the case, Marshall used a doctrine of international law, the
rule of discovery. This principle, recognized among European nations,
gives title of New World lands to the European sovereign first exploring the area. 108 Title obtained under the rule of discovery does not
mean that Native American inhabitants have no right to the land. The
Indians have a right of occupancy10 9 that can be extinguished only by,
104. Id. at 594.
105. Id. at 555-57, 571-72.
106. Id. at 560.
107. Id. at 591-92.
108. This doctrine has its intellectual roots in the ideas of Francisco de Vitoria, a
Spanish theologian of the sixteenth century, who recognized that Indians, although

heathens, had property rights. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAw 50-52 (1982 ed.); V. DELORIA & C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANs, AMERICAN
2-4 (1983). In I'Intosh, Marshall's decision cites extensive legal history to
show recognition of this rule of discovery, especially by England and its successor in
interest, the United States. 21 U.S. at 572-87. Marshall explains that the rule was
"necessary in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war" between
European countries. Id. at 573. Finally, in a curious argument, Marshall asserts that
since the United States has "unequivocally" followed this rule, id at 587, has defended its rights under the rule "by the sword," id. at 588, and since it is the basis of
all land titles in the nation, id. at 588-89, the courts must respect and enforce the rule.
Id. at 588, 591.
109. Id. at 574, 591. Under the rule of discovery, aboriginal people's possessory
interest in the lands they occupy is less than fee title. Marshall defends denying Indians title with a policy argument, finding "some excuse, if not justification, in the character and habits of the people." Id. at 589. As he explains, the relationship between
Indians and settlers differs from that of a conquered European people and a victorious
neighbor state. Normally, a conquered people's rights could be respected because they
could either become citizens of the conquering nation or could be safely governed as a
distinct people. Id. at 589-90. The Indians, however, proved themselves incapable of
either of these solutions:
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a
wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they
were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to
repel by arms every attempt on their independence.
Id. at 590.
Even at this early date, Marshall was confronting the unresolvable problem of coexistence between aboriginal people in a subsistence culture and settlers inculcated
with Western values and operating in a capitalist economy. Allowing these aboriginal
people to continue their subsistence use of land interfered with settlers' designs to
JUSTICE
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or with the consent of, the sovereign holding title to the area under the
rule of discovery.110
Subsequent cases have fleshed out the nature of aboriginal title

rights. Aboriginal title is a collective, not an individual, right, with
title held by the tribe, rather than by its individual members. " Furthermore, aboriginal title can only be extinguished by treaty or by statute."12 When Congress does extinguish aboriginal title by statute, no

compensation is owed under the fifth amendment.11 a Conversely,
when rights are given to Indians in treaty or statute in exchange for
extinguished aboriginal title, such treaty or statutory rights are entitled to fifth amendment protection.114

The doctrine of aboriginal title has special importance in Alaska.
ANCSA, which extinguished any Native claims based on aboriginal
title and granted lands to Native corporations in settlement of such
build a growing capitalist economy in North America, yet the Indians stubbornly refused to assimilate, join the "mainstream" economic system, and give up their culture
and traditional hunting economy. Federal Indian policy has struggled with these two
alternatives ever since, swinging back and forth between periods of trying to assimilate
Indians into the dominant American economy and respecting a separate co-existence
allowing Indians to continue their traditional ways. See generally T. BERGER, supra
note 7, at 79-87; F. COHEN, supra note 108, at 47-206 (Chapter Two: History of
Indian Policy).
110. See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 585; see also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974).
111. Oneida Indian Nation, 414 U.S. at 667; United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 46 (1946). But see United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 50 n. 14
(1985) and cases cited therein. Indian possessory rights include rights to timber and
mineral resources of the land, see United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. I 11
(1938), and are not limited to resources used by the Indians in aboriginal times. The
possessory rights of Indians under aboriginal title are exclusive, and a third party
occupying the land is liable in trespass. See United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v.
Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). Furthermore, third parties holding title
under federal grants or public land laws have no right to present possession as long as
Indians still hold aboriginal title to the land. Id.
112. See generally, F. COHEN, supra note 108, at 492 (many statutes extinguishing
such title were accompanied by executive agreements with the tribes involved); Cohen, OriginalIndian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 51-54 (1947).
113. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1955).
In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Supreme Court recognized that congressional power to extinguish
aboriginal title is "supreme." Id. at 281 (quoting Hualpai Indians v. Sante Fe Pac.
R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941)). The Court explained that this rule "leaves with
Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for the termination of Indian occupancy of Government-owned land rather than making compensation for its
value a rigid constitutional principle." Id. at 291. The Court defended its holding by
stating: "[N]o other course would meet the problem of the growth of the United
States except to make congressional contributions for Indian lands rather than to subject the Government to an obligation to pay the value when taken with interest to the
date of payment." Id. at 290.
114. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 277.
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claims, can only be understood in reference to this doctrine explicated
in M'Intosh.
B.

Federal Trust Responsibility

The second and third John Marshall Indian law decisions discuss
the relationships between the federal, tribal, and state governments.
The rule of discovery and doctrine of aboriginal title deal primarily
with the property rights of Native Americans. Even these property
doctrines, however, implicitly recognize an Indian right to sovereign
government, since these doctrines recognize that aboriginal title is held
communally by the tribe and that the tribe deals government to government with the United States to cede such title. John Marshall clarified the relationships of tribal governments to the federal government
115
and to the states in two cases involving the Cherokee in Georgia.
The first case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,11 6 was filed in the
Supreme Court as a case within the Court's original jurisdiction after
Georgia passed laws whose enforcement would strip the Cherokee of
their land and tribal sovereign powers. The tribe's claim to original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court could only be upheld if the tribe
qualified as a "foreign state."1 1 7 Marshall wrote the majority opinion
denying the Court's jurisdiction over the case, despite finding that the
Cherokee Nation was a state. Without discussion, Marshall implicitly
recognized that Cherokee sovereignty preexisted European contact.
In support of its finding that the tribe was a state, the decision noted
that the Indians "have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country.""1 8 Marshall, however, was compelled to
deny jurisdiction over the case, because he found that this Cherokee
state was not aforeign state.1 1 9 It was, as Marshall explained, a "domestic dependent nation,"1 20 and its "relation to the United States re12 1
semble[d] that of a ward to his guardian."
The nature of these "domestic dependent nations," their powers,
and their trust relationship to the United States was further elucidated
when the conflict between the State of Georgia and the Cherokee tribe
returned to the Court two years later in Worcester v. Georgia.122 This
case arose when a missionary named Worcester refused to obtain a
115. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.

Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
116. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
117. Id. at 20.
118. Id. at 16.
119. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 17.
121. Id.

122. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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state permit to enter lands set aside for the Cherokee in federal treaties. When prosecuted and sentenced, he appealed his conviction, asserting that the state law requiring the permit was unconstitutional as
repugnant to federal law, namely treaties between the Cherokee and
the United States.123 Chief Justice Marshall again wrote for the
Court, holding the conviction invalid as interfering with the relations
between the Cherokee and the federal government and as inconsistent
with those treaties. 124 In his decision, Marshall began with two premises from M'Intosh and Cherokee Nation: (1) the Cherokee Nation is a
government whose powers and authority predate European contact;' 25
and (2) the rule of discovery both recognizes Indian land rights' 26 and
27
allows the Indians to sell their lands only to the United States.'
Conversely, under the federal constitution's Indian commerce clause,
Congress has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with tribes.' 2 8 The Cherokee Nation and the federal government had entered into a treaty in
which the Cherokee ceded certain lands, accepted the protection of the
United States, and guaranteed the remaining Cherokee lands. 2 9 Marshall found that under this treaty, "[t]he Cherokee Nation . . .is a
distinct community occupying its own territory... in which the laws
of Georgia can have no force." 130
IV.

INDIAN COUNTRY AND TRIBAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW

Recognition that tribes exist as limited sovereigns within our federal system logically leads to two corollaries: (1) tribes have inherent
power to govern their members and their territory; and (2) state governments generally lack authority to apply state law to tribal members
and within tribal territory. If tribal and state law conflict, two levels
of analysis are necessary to determine which law applies. First, for
123. Id. at 538-41.
124. Id. at 561.
125. Id. at 542-43.
126. Id. at 544.
127. Id. at 551-52.
128. Id. at 558-59.
129. Id. at 551-56. In interpreting this treaty, Marshall employed several of the
canons of construction applicable to federal laws affecting Indian rights, For instance,
Marshall interpreted the treaty as the uneducated Indians would have understood it.
Id. at 552-53 (interpreting term "alloted"). Marshall also required the treaty to speak
clearly in order to limit tribal sovereign rights, stating that ambiguous language did
not act to surrender Cherokee self-government: "[h]ad such a result been intended, it
would have been openly avowed." Id. at 554. The use of such canons of construction
in modem case law are discussed infra notes 189-205 and accompanying text.
130. Id. at 561. This complete preemption of state law in Indian country has been
eroded in modem case law. See infra notes 206-49 and accompanying text.
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tribal law to apply, the land must qualify as "Indian country.' 13 1 Indian country status does not necessarily mean that state law is preempted. Rather, once a given piece of land is found to be Indian
country, tribal preemption analysis is used to determine whether state

law can apply.
A. Indian Country
1. Indian Country Principles. "Indian country" comprises the
lands where tribes can operate as governments. In 1948, Congress defined Indian country as: (1) reservations, (2) allotments, and (3) dependent Indian communities. 132 Lands included in the first two
categories are easy to delineate. "Reservations" are designated as such
and set aside for Indians by the federal government in treaty, statute,
or executive order.133 "Allotments" include all forms of property held
34
in restricted or trust status for Native Americans.1
The lands that qualify as "dependent Indian communities," however, are difficult to identify. This difficulty rests in part on Congress'
refusal to expressly define the term. Instead, Congress explained that
the "[d]efinition [was] based on ... construction of the term by the
United States Supreme Court in [United States v.] McGowan and
[United States v.] Sandoval." 135 Therefore, to understand the meaning
of "dependent Indian communities," these two Supreme Court decisions must be discussed.
The phrase "dependent Indian community" was first used by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sandoval 136 to describe an Indian
131. Indian tribes have powers to regulate affairs internal to their communities,
such as family law or criteria for tribal membership, even without the existence of
Indian country. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 108, at 467.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982), construed in Decoteau v. District Court, 420 U.S.
425, 427 n.2 (1975).
133. See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648 (1978) (applying section
1151(a) to the Choctaw Indian reservation in central Mississippi); see generally F.
COHEN, supra note 108, at 34-38.
134. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 108, at 39-41. Most of these lands are the
product of statutes enacted around the turn of this century when federal policy tried
to turn Indians into farmers through the magic of private ownership by "allotting"
tribally owned lands to individual Indians. To protect Indian owners from being
cheated out of their lands by unscrupulous non-Indians, however, these statutes usually required federal approval of any sale or lease of the land, either by having the
United States hold title in trust for the Indian owner ("trust" property) or by placing a
restriction on title requiring federal approval of any sale or lease ("restricted" property). See, eg., Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665, 667 (10th Cir.
1980) (modern discussion of Indian allotments); see generally F. COHEN, supra note
108, at 130-43.
135. H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 92 app. (citations omitted),
quoted in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982) historical and revision note.
136. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
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pueblo in New Mexico that did not qualify as a reservation. 137 The
Court was reviewing a criminal conviction under federal Indian liquor
laws. Those laws barred the importation of liquor into Indian country. The Court held that the defendant could be indicted under that
statute,1 38 finding that the pueblo was comparable to a reservation because its residents were "regarded and treated by the United States as
requiring special consideration and protection, like other Indian
39
communities."1
The Supreme Court applied the dependent Indian community
term again in United States v. McGowan, 140 holding that the Reno Indian Colony, established on a tract purchased by the United States to
provide lands in a permanent settlement for needy Indians scattered
over the State of Nevada, qualified as Indian country.' 4' The Court
emphasized that these Indians were receiving the same government
services as reservation Indians, and that the land had been set apart
for the Indians' use. 142 In sum, based on these seminal cases incorporated into statute, the term dependent Indian community includes
lands occupied by Indians that are functionally equivalent to reservations: lands set aside for benefit of Indians where Indian4 3residents are
eligible for federal services intended to benefit Indians.1
The lower federal courts, deciding cases in recent years, have developed the factors enumerated in Sandoval and McGowan into a formalized test for finding land a dependent Indian community. These
factors can be summarized as including:
(1) whether the federal government or a tribe owns the land;
(2) whether the land is predominantly inhabited or used by Native
Americans;
(3) whether there is a sufficient relationship of the people occupying the land to their tribe and the federal government;
(4) whether the residents form a cohesive community; and
(5) whether the lands have been set aside for the use, occupancy,
and protection of dependent Native American people. 144
137. Id. at 48. The land, held under a Mexican treaty, failed to qualify as a reservation because it was held by the tribe in fee simple with no federal supervision or
restrictions on alienation. Id.
138. Id. at 49.
139. Id. at 39.
140. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
141. Id. at 538-39. (This case also involved application of federal liquor laws.)
142. Id.
143. F. COHEN, supra note 108, at 34.
144. See United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v.
South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981); Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211
(8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981); Cheyenne-Arapahoe Tribes v.
Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980); City of Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan v. Andrus, 532 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1980); United States v. Mound, 477 F. Supp. 156
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Although all of these factors are relevant, they are not all of equal
weight and each one does not have to be met in order for land to
qualify as a dependent Indian community.14 5 The courts have empha-

sized the importance of the last requirement, saying that "the ultimate
issue [is] whether the evidence shows that the area was established for
' ' 146
the use, occupancy and protection of dependent Indians.
Applying this test in the lower forty-eight, courts have found a
community not to be predominantly inhabited by Native Americans
when only 16.3% of the population was Indian, 14 7 but have been satisfied when at least nineteen out of fifty-three heads of households in a
housing project run by a tribal housing authority were Indian.' 48 The
requirement of examining the relationship of the people to their tribe

has been met in cases considering off-reservation Indian housing
projects where the tribal government provided all available tribal services to the project. 149 Furthermore, the community has been found to
have the requisite relationship to the federal government when agen-

cies are providing Indian programs (social services) to community res-

idents under federal trust responsibility.' 5 0 Most of these cases have

(D.S.D. 1979). The Ninth Circuit has never decided a dependent Indian community
case.
145. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding land to
qualify as dependent Indian community even though court did not determine whether
cohesiveness factor was met).
146. United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1982).
147. Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211, 213 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 941 (1981).
148. United States v. Mound, 477 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D.S.D. 1979). The court was
judging race solely on the basis of names and noted that another 15 families with
names of French extraction probably could be found to be Indian. Id. The court
concluded that "the exact percentage of Indian occupation [in the project] is fluid."
Id.
149. United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 840-41 (8th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Mound, 477 F. Supp. 156, 159-60 (D.S.D. 1979). In South Dakota tribal
services included a senior citizens program, a maternal and child health program, a
canning program, a school busing program for Indian students in the project, and a
tribal food stamp and commodities program. 665 F.2d at 840.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 338-39 (8th Cir. 1986) (requirement met by Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") roads and law enforcement);
United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75, 78 (1st Cir. 1982) (requirement satisfied by
federal grants to tribe for tribal courts and law enforcement); United States v. South
Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 1981) (requirement met by Indian Health Service
water and sewer facilities, garbage truck, and hospital, all BIA programs, and Housing and Urban Development subsidy to housing project under Indian housing program); United States v. Mound, 477 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D.S.D. 1979) (requirement
met by Indian Health Service water and sewer and medical services, roads provided by
BIA, fire protection and schools provided under joint agreement between BIA and
town, and school bus service mostly underwritten by BIA).
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s ' or
arisen either in settlements that are largely Indian in population'
15 2
authorities.
housing
tribal
by
operated
projects
in housing

2. Indian Country in Alaska. Tribes in Alaska, with a single ex-

ception, 153 do not have reservations, and thus lack the major tribal
land-base found in the lower forty-eight. Two types of restricted property, however, exist in Alaska: restricted townsite lots and Native allotments.154 Under the Alaska Townsite Act of 1926,155 many Alaska
Natives have restricted deeds to the lots in villages underneath their

homes.156 These lands, however, lie within villages, and thus are irrelevant to the regulation of hunting, since they are not hunting grounds.
The allotment lands are both more extensive than restricted townsites

and more strategically placed for the regulation of hunting. Nearly
10,000 Native Alaskans have applied for Native allotments.1 7 Under
151. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 338-39 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Martine, 442 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir. 1971).
152. United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839-40 (8th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Mound, 477 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D.S.D. 1979).
153. A reservation was established by federal statute on the Annette Islands, in the
Alexander Archipelago, for the use of the Metlakahtla Indians. See 48 U.S.C. § 358
(1982); see also D. CASE, supra note 36, at 87.
154. People of South Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough held that restricted property
in Alaska not within reservations does not benefit from a "presumption of no state
jurisdiction," as do lands within the exterior of reservations. 466 F. Supp. 870, 877
(D. Alaska 1979) (per von der Heydt, C.J.). This "presumption" does not appear to
exist in modern cases analyzing tribal and state jurisdiction and the Alaska case is an
inexplicable aberration. Compare Langley v. Ryder, 778 F.2d 1092, 1095 (5th Cir.
1985) ("Regardless, however, whether the lands are merely held in trust for the Indians or whether the lands have officially been proclaimed a reservation, the lands are
clearly Indian country, and the district court's conclusion [federal, not state, government has jurisdiction over Indian country] was correct.") with Washoe Tribe of Nevada and California v. Greenley, 674 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1982) (failing to allow
state, not a party to district court action, to appeal declaratory judgment and injunction prohibiting enforcement of state hunting laws and regulations on off-reservation
allotments). See also Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369, slip op. at 2021 (D. Alaska Dec. 3, 1986) (Alaska tribal government possesses immunity from suit
like that of any other Indian tribe in contiguous United States).
155. Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 379, § 1, 44 Stat. 629 (formerly codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 733), repealed by Federal Land Policy & Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94579, § 703, 90 Stat. 2743, 2790.
156. D. CASE, supra note 36, at 157-60.
157. The statute authorizing Alaska Natives to receive allotments rested in obscurity for decades, during which time almost no Alaska allotment claims were submitted
to the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). Most of the nearly 10,000 applications
ever made under this law were submitted to BLM in the last few years before 1971, as
it became clear that Congress in ANCSA would repeal the 1906 Allotment Act. Telephone interview with Bob Arndorfer, Bureau of Land Management, Anchorage
(1987). The large number of these applications submitted in a short span of time has
overwhelmed BLM, and thus most of these applications are still pending more than
fifteen years later. Id.
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the 1906 Allotment Act, Alaska Natives could receive title to up to
160 acres of public land that they had used or occupied for five years
or more. I5 8 Thus, the allotments consist mostly of sites important for
subsistence hunting or fishing, such as fish camps and trapping cabins.
The allotment parcels, however, are scattered and intermittent, and,

therefore, would create a checkerboard of Indian country if used as a
basis for tribal jurisdiction. Nor do the allotments include even a frac-

tion of the lands used or needed for village subsistence. Thus,
although tribal governments could assert that these lands comprise Indian country, operating an effective hunting regulatory program
would require tribal jurisdiction over a more extensive and contiguous
territory.
Generally, the lands for several miles in all directions around
1 59
each Native village are owned by the ANCSA village corporation.
These lands, easily accessible to the village, usually are used intensively for subsistence, although they do not include the village's entire
as
hunting territory. 160 The question is whether these lands qualify 161
Indian country under the test for "dependent Indian communities."'
158. Act of May 17, 1906, ch. 2469 § 1, 34 Stat. 197, repealed by Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act of 1971 Pub. L. 92-203 § 181(a), 85 Stat. 710. For a more
detailed explanation of the requirements for a valid allotment application, see D.
CASE, supra note 36, at 137-51.
159. ANCSA provided that the core township or townships where each village is
located were withdrawn from entry under the public land laws, and also that the
double ring of townships around the core townships was withdrawn. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1610 (1982). The village corporation selected its lands from among these withdrawn
lands. Id. § 1611(a). The amount each corporation could select varied, depending
largely on the number of its shareholders. Id. § 1613(a). But see id. § 1611(b) (providing that the difference between 22 million acres and total acreage selected by village
corporations shall be allocated to regional corporations which shall reallocate such
surplus acreage on an equitable basis among the Native villages within the region). If
bodies of water intruded to make insufficient land available, the Bureau of Land Management also withdrew additional lands "from the nearest unreserved, vacant and unappropriated public lands." Id. § 1610(a)(3)(A). Additional complications arose
when the lands around the village were national park, national wildlife refuge, national forest, or Naval Petroleum Reserve lands in 1971. However, in general, village
corporation lands surround the village, and most village corporations have exercised
their limited selection discretion to get lands important for the village's subsistence.
See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, ALASKA LAND STATUS MAP (June 1986).
160. See, e.g., S. PEDERSEN & M. COFFING, CARIBOU HUNTING: LAND USE
DIMENSIONS

AND

RECENT

HARVEST PATTERNS

IN KAKTOVIK,

NORTHEAST

ALASKA (ADF&G Subsistence Division Technical Paper No. 92, 1984); R. SCHROEDER & D. ANDERSON, KOTZEBUE SOUND SUBSISTENCE RESOURCE USE MAP INDEX

AND METHODOLOGY (ADF&G Subsistence Division Technical Paper No. 130, 1986);
L. STRATTON & S. GEORGETTE, 1985 COPPER RIVER RESOURCE USE MAP, INDEX
AND METHODOLOGY (ADF&G Subsistence Division Technical Paper No. 124, 1985).
161. The following analysis also applies to ANCSA regional corporation land selections. In making selections, most regional corporations have followed a mixed
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ANCSA village corporation lands surrounding remote villages,
which are used for subsistence by Native village residents, should be
considered to be dependent Indian communities. These lands clearly
meet several factors used by the courts in determining that similar

lands were dependent Indian communities. Since almost all residents
of remote villages are Alaska Natives, it is indeed mostly Natives using
the surrounding ANCSA corporation lands. 162 The federal government provides a variety of services under programs intended to benefit

Native Americans, ranging from subsidized housing 163 to free medical
care.

64

Thus, Natives are just as dependent on the federal govern-

ment for these services as are Indians in the lower forty-eight Indian
communities. 165 In the area of subsistence, the relationship with the
federal government is even stronger, because the federal government

has additional legal responsibilities to Natives under a whole series of
federal laws protecting Native hunting for fur seals,166 whales, 167 polar
strategy, selecting some lands to gain title and thus protection for important subsistence areas that lie too far from villages to qualify for selection by village corporations,
while using other selections to gain title to lands valuable for timber resources or
mineral potential. Thus, for instance, NANA regional corporation has selected lands
around Onion Portage in Kobuk Valley National Park because that land is an important fall caribou hunting area, and NANA has also selected the Red Dog mine site
with a world class lead-zinc deposit for its profit potential. Interview with Walter
Sampson, NANA Corporation (1986).
162. See supra note 4.
163. 24 C.F.R. § 905.102 (1987) (definition of Indian for Indian housing program
includes "[a]ny person recognized as being an Indian or Alaska Native by a tribe, the
government, or any state"); see also Eric v. Secretary of U.S. Dep't of Housing and
Urban Dev., 464 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D. Alaska 1978) (construes statute distributing
federal funding for rural Alaska housing primarily for Alaska Natives under canons of
construction for federal trust responsibility programs); D. CASE, supra note 36, at 195272.
164. 42 C.F.R. § 36.1 (1987) (definition of "Indian" for Indian Health Services
benefits includes "Indians in the continental United States, and Indians, Aleuts and
Eskimos in Alaska").
165. By focusing only on the federal trust responsibility to oversee trust lands, one
author has concluded that the relationship between the federal government and
Alaska Native villages has been significantly changed by ANCSA. See Marston,
Alaska Native Sovereignty: The Limits of the Tribe-Indian Country Test, 17 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 375, 398-99 (1984). Specifically, Marston concludes that "villages on land
held by ANCSA corporations are not tribes within the meaning of traditional tests,
but the federal government recognizes that these villages deserve treatment similar to
that of tribes in Indian country in other states." Id. at 400. This ignores the substantial federal trust responsibilities in areas other than protection of Native land interests.
Cf D. CASE, supra note 36, at 263-64. Yet, it is exactly these sorts of social services,
provided to Indians under the federal trust responsibility, which have satisfied this
part of the dependent Indian community test in reported cases from the lower fortyeight. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 150.
166. Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, Oct. 14,
1957, 8 U.S.T. 2284, T.I.A.S. No. 3948.
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bears, 168 other marine mammals, 169 and migratory waterfowl, 170 as
well as subsistence hunting generally.171 Native residents also have an
active relationship with their tribal governments, which administer a
variety of federally funded programs.172 Furthermore, villages form
cohesive communities, which make use of the surrounding village corporation lands. 173
The element of the dependent Indian community test examining
whether the lands are owned by the federal or tribal government war-

rants detailed discussion, since ANCSA corporation lands are owned
by neither. Reported federal cases from the lower forty-eight applying

the dependent Indian community test have arisen either on federally

or tribally owned lands - meeting the test' 74 - or on lands owned by
non-Indians, which failed to qualify. 175 Therefore, the courts have
167. Convention on Regulation of Whaling, entered into force Nov. 10, 1948, 62
Stat. 3079, T.S. No. 880.
168. Convention for the Conservation of Polar Bears, entered into force Nov. 1,
1976, 27 U.S.T. 3918, T.I.A.S. No. 8409.
169. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1982). See also People
of Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423, 428 (D.D.C. 1979) (Marine Mammal
Protection Act constitutes federal trust responsibility to Alaska Natives).
170. Treaty of Dec. 7, 1916, United States-Britain, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628;
Treaty of Sept. 19, 1974, United States-Japan, 25 U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990;
Treaty of Oct. 13, 1978, United States-Soviet Union, 29 U.S.T. 4647, T.I.A.S. No.
9073; see also Alaska Fish and Wildlife Fed'n & Outdoor Council, Inc. v. Jantzen, 13
Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3023, 3024-26 (D. Alaska 1986)
(subsistence hunting of migratory birds federally regulated under Alaska Game Law
of 1925, which is interpreted under canons of construction applicable to Indian legislation embodying federal trust responsibility).
171. Title VIII of ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3111-3126 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see
also Village of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct.
1396 (1987) (interpreting title VIII under canons of construction applicable to Indian
legislation embodying federal trust responsibility to Alaska Natives).
172. In many remote regions of the state, tribal governments have assigned to regional nonprofit corporations such as Maniilaq, Kawerak, and Bristol Bay Native Association their right to receive federal funds allocated to tribal governments, thus
pooling the funds available to each small village into a regional program. Membership
of the regional nonprofits is composed of the region's tribal governments. The board
of directors is made up of representatives from each member tribal government, who
are responsible for the administration of these programs. See D. CASE, supra note 36,
at 389-405. Such sharing of funds, which enables tribal controlled institutions efficiently to deliver services on a regional basis, should not affect the legal analysis.
173. See, e.g., SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHwEST ALASKA, supra note 3, at 359-71.
174. United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75, 78 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1089 (1982); United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Mound, 477
F. Supp. 156, 159 (D.S.D. 1979).
175. Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
941 (1981) (community where 95% of land deeded and only 16.3% of population
Indian does not qualify as dependent Indian community).
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never considered whether this part of the test could be met by lands 176
of
a non-tribal institution that were owned and managed by Natives.
Although cases have listed this requirement as part of the test for a
dependent Indian community, 177 no reported federal case has held
that land owned by individual Indians or by an Indian owned entity
does not qualify under the test.
The final element examines whether the lands are set aside for the
use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Native Americans. Certainly, the federal grant of these lands in ANCSA was intended to
benefit and to protect Alaska Natives - the purpose clause of the
statute declares as much.1 78 Nothing in ANCSA requires that the corporations allow actual use and occupancy of the lands by Native
shareholders. Certainly Congress, however, expected, 179 and most
corporations in practice have, allowed Native shareholders freely to
use corporation lands for subsistence and other purposes. 80 Moreover, many corporations selected lands intensively used for subsistence
by their Native shareholders, using ANCSA as a vehicle for Natives to
gain local control and potentially exclusive use of subsistence hunting
areas.
Congressional actions since 1971 have reaffirmed Congress' intent
that lands were granted to ANCSA corporations for the benefit of
Alaska Natives. Amendments to ANCSA have made it harder for
Native corporations to lose their undeveloped lands that are being
used for subsistence. For instance, ANCSA initially provided that
176. The courts have held that summary judgment is not a proper mode to determine whether lands lie within a dependent Indian community. City of Sault Ste.
Marie, Michigan v. Andrus, 532 F. Supp. 157, 165 (D.D.C. 1980) ("analysis of [the
factors set forth in Martine] calls for an extensive factor inquiry, and the court is
persuaded that the necessity for such an inquiry precludes summary judgment"). Yet,
clearly, if this single - and factually simple - factor were determining, land could be
found not to be Indian country based on failing to meet this requirement alone. The
fact that summary judgment is unavailable to determine whether lands qualify as a
dependent Indian community tends to indicate that this part of the test either is not an
absolute requirement, or that it may be met by ownership that is "Native American"
but not federal or tribal ownership.
177. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 174.
178. That clause states that "the settlement should be accomplished ...

in con-

formity with the real economic and social needs of Natives ... with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and property." 43 U.S.C.

§ 1601(b) (1982).
179. Congress determined the lands to be selected, taking into consideration "the
land needed for ordinary village sites and village expansion, the land needed for a
subsistence hunting and fishing economy by many of the Natives, and the land needed
by the Natives as a form of capital for economic development." H. REP. No. 523, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2192.
180. Interview with Willie Goodwin, Kikiktagruk Inupiat Corp. (1986); Interview
with Walter Sampson, NANA Regional Corp. (1986).
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corporation lands would be exempt from state and local property taxes
only until 1991, twenty years after the enactment of ANCSA.18 1 Since
the ANCSA conveyance process was proceeding slowly, and since
ANCSA corporations might be unable to pay taxes assessed on these
extensive but often monetarily unproductive assets, this tax exemption
was extended in 1980 to last for twenty years from the date that the
corporation received title to the lands. 182 Additionally, Congress provided that the tax moratorium could be extended indefinitely at the
corporation's option, if the corporation placed its undeveloped lands
into a land bank.1 3 Placing lands in the land bank also would protect
them from loss for adverse possession or the satisfaction of a judgment.1 84 Amendments to ANCSA have also given Native corporations methods to maintain corporate control in Native hands. By
majority shareholder vote, shareholders of a corporation may amend
the articles of incorporation before December 18, 1991, to deny voting
rights to any shareholder who is not a Native or a descendant of a
Native and to grant the corporation the right of first refusal before any
sale of corporation shares.18 5 By enacting these protections, Congress
has clarified that these lands are intended to benefit Alaska Natives
86
and should not be allowed easily to pass out of Native ownership.
In sum, a strong case can be made that ANCSA lands qualify as
Indian country under the dependent Indian community test, but the
issue will undoubtedly have to be tested in court. This article addresses the application of Indian country analysis to ANCSA corporation lands in some detail, both because such lands surround every
Native village and because the detailed analysis of these lands provides
the reader with a sense of the result of such analysis when applied to
other lands. Ultimately, other non-corporate lands may be found to
181. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d)(1) (1982), repealedby Pub. L. No. 96-487, Dec. 2, 1980,
94 Stat. 2434.
182. ANILCA § 904, 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d)(1) (1982).
183. ANILCA § 907, 43 U.S.C. § 1636(c)(2)(B) (1982).
184. 43 U.S.C. § 1636(c)(2)(A), (c) (1982). Other private landowners did not receive such extensive protective benefits if they placed their lands in the land bank. Cf
id. at § 1636(c)(1). Congress implicitly admitted that the provisions regarding landbanked ANCSA corporation lands altered state jurisdiction, by stating that the land
bank provisions should not be construed as affecting the civil or criminal jurisdiction
of the state, except for those provisions applicable to ANCSA corporation lands. Id.
§ 1636(c)(4)(A).
185. ANILCA § 1401, 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(3)(B) (1982).
186. But see Marston, supra note 165, at 399 (concluding that since ANCSA lands
are freely alienable, these lands were not set apart for the use, occupancy, and protection of Alaska Natives).
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qualify as Indian country. 187 The ANCSA lands, however, constitute

a basic land base for tribes enacting hunting codes.
B.

Tribal Preemption of State Law

Even on Indian country lands, however, a tribal government regulatory program does not necessarily preempt the operation of state

law. A special preemption test determines whether tribal law, supported by federal law, preempts state law. 188 Since tribal preemption
187. Sections of ANILCA setting aside many of the parks, preserves, monuments,
and wildlife refuges among other purposes as habitat for subsistence resources while
"grandfathering in" subsistence use of those areas may qualify as setting those lands
aside for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Native people. See, e.g.,
ANILCA §§ 201-202, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1982) (National Parks, Preserves, and Monuments), ANILCA §§ 302-303, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1982). Even if such federal lands
qualify as Indian country, state game regulations may be applicable to those lands
under the preemption analysis discussed below. That preemption analysis turns, in
part, on whether any federal laws grant the state jurisdiction over Indian country
lands. For federal lands such a statute exists - section 805 of ANILCA authorizes
state management of federal lands if certain conditions are met. See 16 U.S.C. § 3115
(1982); see also infra discussion at notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
188. The Supreme Court has stated that there are, in fact, two separate preemption
analyses in federal Indian law. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136, 142 (1980). A leading scholar of federal Indian law has labeled these two
tests "geographical preemption" and "subject matter preemption" analysis. C. WILKINSON, supra note 91, at 93. The Court first developed and used geographical preemption analysis in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). In Williams, the Court held
that a state court could not hear a case brought by a non-Indian store-owner against
Indian creditors for debts incurred at the store on the reservation, because the Navajo
Nation had established a fully operational set of tribal courts to hear such cases. The
Court explained that such an exercise of state court jurisdiction was barred, because
"it would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and
hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves." Id. at 223.
In spite of this sweeping language, Williams does not carve out a judicially conceived sphere of exclusive tribal authority. Rather, the holding is rooted in federal
statutes and treaties, interpreted under the canons of construction for statutes dealing
with Indian and tribal rights. The Williams holding can be accurately summed up by
saying that "absent governingActs of Congress, the question has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them." Id. at 220 (citing Utah & Northern Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28
(1885) (emphasis added)). In Williams, the Court felt that if the power to govern
themselves is to be taken away from the Indians, then Congress and not the state must
do it. Id. at 223. Thus, geographical preemption analysis starts with a presumption of
tribal jurisdiction in Indian country and searches applicable federal statutes and treaties for law granting state jurisdiction. For instance, in Williams, the Court found
support for its ruling in the treaty with the Navajos, 15 Stat. 667, setting apart the
reservation for their permanent home. Williams, 358 U.S. at 221. The Court noted
that the State of Arizona had not assumed jurisdiction under the provisions of Public
Law 280. Id. at 222-23. For a discussion of this statute, see infra notes 255-64. The
Court also saw importance in the fact that the Indian Reorganization Act encouraged
tribal governments and courts to become stronger (without mentioning that the
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analysis involves interpreting and applying federal statutes, this discussion will first describe the canons of construction used to interpret
federal statutes affecting the rights and powers of Indians and tribes
before turning to the preemption analysis itself.
1. Canons of statutory construction. The canons for construing
federal statutes dealing with Native Americans require that any ambiguities in such statutes are to be resolved so as to uphold the rights of
Native Americans.1 8 9 Thus, when Congress acts to abolish Native
American rights it must do so clearly and unequivocably, 190 and rights
created in legislation passed for the benefit of Native Americans are to
be liberally construed. 19 1
Examining several cases gives an idea of how these rules work in
practice. In Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States,192 the Court
considered whether the Menominees still had treaty hunting and fishing rights. Congress had passed the Menominee Termination Act of
1954,193 which "terminated" the federal trust relationship with the
tribe, so that the tribe would receive no further federal subsidies. This
statute also provided that after this termination, state law "shall apply
to the tribe and its members in the same manner as ...to other citizens and persons." 194 The Court held that this statute did not abrogate treaty hunting and fishing rights. 195 Such an abrogation, the
Court explained, would trigger a fifth amendment taking claim and
Navajos had declined to reorganize under that statute), id. at 220, and that the Bureau
of Indian Affairs had "assisted in strengthening the Navajo tribal government and its
courts." Id. at 222. This sort of statutory analysis relying on powers not granted to
the state in federal law, closely resembles the treatment of statutes under "subject
matter preemption" analysis. Cf McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164
(1973).
Professor Wilkinson distinguished geographical preemption as based on law creating Indian country, while subject matter preemption involved examining federal
statutes governing discrete substantive subjects. C. WILKINSON, supra note 91, at 93.
For purposes of assessing tribal hunting regulations, the applicable geographic statute
is ANCSA. The implications of ANCSA are discussed below in a discussion of tribal
preemption, which conforms with the preemption analysis that Professor Wilkinson
labels "subject matter preemption." See infra notes 265-86 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., United States v. Sante Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248
U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
190. See, e.g., DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968).
191. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (6 Wall.) 737, 759 (1867).
192. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
193. Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250, 1-3, 5-12, 14, repealedby Pub. L.
93-197, § 3(b), 87 Stat. 770 (1973).
194. Menominee Tribe of Indians, 391 U.S. at 410 (quoting Menominee Termination Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-399, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250).
195. Id. at 412.
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the Court found it "difficult to believe that Congress, without explicit
statement, would subject the United States to a claim for
196
compensation."
In Bryan v. Itasca County 197 the question was whether Public
Law 280,198 which provided that on specified Indian country lands the
state laws "that are of general application to private persons or private
property shall have the same force and effect within... Indian country as they have elsewhere," 199 allowed the application of state taxes
and regulatory laws in those Indian country areas. The Court held
that state taxes and regulatory laws were not included. 20° The Court
noted that Public Law 280 primarily dealt with the application of state
criminal laws, and that the provision regarding state civil jurisdiction
had been slipped in with virtually no legislative history. 20 ' The Court,
therefore, explained that a more explicit statement would be needed
"if such a sweeping change in the status of tribal government
and res'20 2
ervation Indians had been contemplated by Congress.
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,20 3 the Court was confronted
with a case of sex discrimination, an apparent violation of the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968.2 04 Although the Court found that this statute prevented tribes from denying the equal protection of the laws, the
only remedy mentioned was habeas corpus. Since Congress had not
waived tribal immunity from suit, the Court would not imply a cause
of action based on the statute in federal court. 20 5
2. Preemption analysis. The preemption analysis used in federal
Indian law differs from that used to analyze conflicts between federal
and state law, absent tribal involvement 20 6 - tribal preemption analysis does not rely heavily on a search for expressions of congressional
intent. 20 7 Rather, the analysis involves two parts, first examining the
federal statutory framework and then balancing the competing tribal,
196. Id at 413.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

426 U.S. 373 (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982).
Id., quoted in Bryan, 426 U.S. at 384.
Bryan, 426 U.S. at 390.
See id. at 381.
Id.
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).

205. 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
206. Compare White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44
(1980) with Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
207. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) (Court
explained that it has "rejected the proposition that [Indian subject matter] preemption
requires 'an express Congressional statement to that effect'" (quoting Bracker, 448

U.S. at 144)).
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federal, and state interests at stake.208 For the first part of the test,
courts examine federal law, using the rules of liberal interpretation applicable to Indian statutes 20 9 and against a backdrop of Indian tribal
sovereignty, 2 10 to determine whether state jurisdiction "interferes or is
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal
law. ' 2 11 This statutory analysis involves examining federal laws "in
terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of
sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of tribal independence. '212 The second part of the test requires determining
whether "the State interests at stake are sufficient to justify the asser'21 3
tion of State authority.
This rubric, however, does not fully describe the Court's actual
approach in these cases. Understanding preemption analysis requires
examining what the Court does, rather than what it says. In operation, this analysis involves searching for applicable federal statutes,
which include statutes implicitly supporting exclusive tribal jurisdiction as well as any granting state jurisdiction. When the state, however, is attempting to apply its law to Indians in Indian country, the
analysis begins with a presumption that state law is preempted, because to prevail in these cases the state must point to a federal statute
affirmatively granting state jurisdiction. By contrast, exclusive tribal
jurisdiction will be upheld even if its only support in federal law is by
negative implication, that is, when federal statutes grant state jurisdiction in situations other than the controversy at bar but federal law is
silent concerning the factual situation before the court.
The examination of several cases illustrates and clarifies the actual operation of the preemption test. In McClanahan v. State Tax
Commission ,214 the Court was faced with the task of determining
whether an Indian living and working on the Navajo reservation was
208. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145-51.

209. See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
210. See, e.g., id. at 172. The Court concluded:
When this canon of construction is taken together with the tradition of Indian independence... it cannot be doubted that the reservation of certain

lands for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Navajos and the exclusion
of non-Navajos from the prescribed area was meant to establish the lands as
within the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos under general supervision.
Id. at 174-75.
211. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334; accord Three Affiliated Tribes of
the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S.

-,

106 S. Ct. 2305, 2309-10

(1986); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145 (describing the test as "a particularized inquiry into
the nature of the state, federal and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to
determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate
federal law.").
212. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144-45.
213. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334.

214. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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exempt from state income tax liability. The Court noted that the
treaty with the Navajos was silent concerning the application of state
law or taxes,2 15 but found support for preemption of state law in a
treaty provision setting aside reservation lands for exclusive Navajo
use.2 16 The Court liberally interpreted the implications of this treaty
provision, citing three factors: (1) canons of construction interpreting
doubtful expressions in favor of the Indians, (2) the tradition of Indian
independence tracing back to Worcester v. Georgia,2 17 and (3) consistent congressional assumptions that states lack jurisdiction over reservation Indians.2 18 These three factors would, in fact, warrant
expansive interpretation of any statute granting or recognizing Indian
rights to Indian country lands.
At the same time, the Court found support for preemption of
state law in the negative implication of two federal laws that chose not
to grant state jurisdiction in this situation. The Arizona Enabling Act
contained language clarifying that its provisions did not limit the
state's power to tax Indian property outside the reservation. 21 9 From
this, the Court implied that Arizona did not have the power to tax on
the reservation. 220 The Buck Act 22 1 governing state taxation in federal
enclaves contained a clarification which explained that its provisions
did not authorize state taxation of "any Indians not otherwise
taxed. 12 22 The legislative history, as the Court explained, made clear
that this phrase referred to reservation Indians.22 3 The Court noted
that this provision limiting the scope of the statute would not have
been inserted if the state had the power to assess such taxes anyway,
and concluded that implicit in this section was a congressional assumption that the state lacked such power.224
Thus, both of these statutes grant the state jurisdiction over certain situations, but do not extend state jurisdiction over the controversy before the Court. The Court used these statutes, which did not
explicitly speak to the situation before the Court, to support the conclusion that state law was preempted. 2 25 This sort of analysis basically
215. Id. at 173-74.
216. Id. at 174.
217. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
218. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174-75.
219. Pub. L. No. 61-219, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 569, 570 (1910), quoted in McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 176.
220. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 175-76.
221. 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-110 (1982).
222. Id. § 109.
223. S.REP. No. 1625, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 2, 4 (1940), cited in McClanahan, 411
U.S. at 176-77 (construing 4 U.S.C. § 109 (1982)).
224. McClanahan,411 U.S. at 176-77.
225. Id. at 181. Similarly, in Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g (Wold II), the Court concluded that since the state's actions were
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comes down to a presumption of exclusive tribal jurisdiction in Indian
country, and a search for some statute explicitly granting the state
jurisdiction. Therefore, absent a statute fairly clearly indicating state
jurisdiction, state law is preempted.
A later case, White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,226 emphasized the second part of the test involving balancing tribal, federal, and
state interests. Bracker involved applying state motor vehicle and fuel
taxes to trucks operated by a non-Indian contractor harvesting tribal
timber on the reservation. 227 Tribal timber receipts funded tribal government. 22 8 Since tribal timber harvests were comprehensively regulated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to assure that Indians receive
maximal stumpage value, profit, and jobs, 229 the Court said that there
was "no room for [state] taxes in the comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme." 2 30 The Court found that state taxes would substantially interfere with tribal and state interests in maximizing timber revenues
but could identify no legitimate state regulatory interest. 23 1 Thus, the
Court introduced into the preemption analysis an examination of the
effect of state law on tribal, federal, and state interests.
Several Supreme Court cases have applied this preemption analysis to tribal hunting codes. In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe,23 2 the Court considered whether the state could impose its
hunting seasons and bag limits, concurrently with tribal regulations,
on hunting by non-Indians on tribal reservation lands. 233 The tribe,
with extensive assistance from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, was developing sport hunting on the reservation, both to raise revenue by selling
tribal hunting licenses and also to provide jobs for its people. 234 State
game regulations conflicted with, and often were more restrictive than,
tribal rules. 23 5 Federal law supported tribal jurisdiction over hunting
on tribal lands by making it a federal offense to violate tribal hunting
codes or to hunt without tribal consent.23 6 Since most of the fish and
not authorized by Public Law 280, such actions were barred. - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct.
2305, 2315 (1986).
226. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
227. Id. at 138-40.
228. Id. at 138 (timber operations accounted for more than 90% of the tribe's annual profits).
229. Id. at 146-47.
230. Id. at 148.
231. Id. at 149-50.
232. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
233. As the Court explained, "[n]umerous conflicts exist[ed] between state and tribal hunting regulations." Id. For example, the tribe allowed a hunter to kill a buck
and a doe, whereas the state permitted the taking of a buck only. Id. at 329.
234. Id. at 327-29.
235. Id. at 329.
236. Id. at 337-38.
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game did not migrate off the reservation, 237 New Mexico could neither
point to any state regulatory function that would be interfered with,
nor any off-reservation effects warranting state regulation. 238 The
Court held that state law was preempted, even in its application to
non-Indian hunting.
In Montana v. United States,239 the issue was whether Montana
could regulate fishing by non-Indians on state-owned lands (the beds
of navigable waterways) within reservation boundaries. 240 In order to
regulate non-Indians on non-Indian lands, the Court held that the
tribe must show "some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." 24 1 Since the
tribe was not historically dependent on fishing, the Court did not find
any such effects justifying tribal jurisdiction. 24 2 The federal statutes
that had supported exclusive Mescalero Apache jurisdiction did not
help the Crow Tribe on non-Indian lands, because those statutes do
not apply on such land. 243 The Court upheld state, rather than tribal,
jurisdiction.
Only in Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Departmentof Game of Washington (PuyallupII1),244 did the Supreme Court allow a state to regulate
hunting or fishing by Indians in Indian country. That decision can
only be understood in its historical context, as one battle in the long
war over Pacific Northwest Indian treaty fishing rights. That dispute
over Indian treaty fishing rights went to the United States Supreme
Court twice regarding Indians' off-reservation fishing rights 24 5 before
the litigants reached the question of whether the state could limit Indian take of steelhead trout on non-Indian-owned lands within reservation boundaries. The treaty reserved to the Indians the right to take
237. Id. at 342.
238. Id. at 341-42.
239. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
240. Id. The Court summarily upheld that portion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion
holding that the tribe did have jurisdiction to prohibit nonmembers from hunting or
fishing on land owned by the tribe or held in trust by the United States for the tribe.

Id. at 557.
241. Id. at 566.
242. Id. Montana had been regulating such fishing for years, until the Crow Tribe
passed a resolution barring non-tribal members from hunting and fishing on the reser-

vation. Id. at 564 n.13.
243. Id. at 558-63; see also Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, 15 Stat. 649 (1868).
244. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
245. Department of Game of Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973)
(Puyallup II); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392
(1968) (Puyallup I).
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fish off the reservation "in common with" state citizens. 24 6 In Puyallup I, the Court held that the state could impose reasonable and necessary conservation measures on off-reservation Indian treaty fishing. 247
In Puyallup I1, the Court directed that state courts fairly apportion
248
the off-reservation steelhead between Indian and non-Indian fishers.
Only when the litigation returned for the third time was the Court
asked to consider whether the state could impose an overall limit on
Indian fishing on the reservation. The Court had already established
that both Indians and non-Indians had a right to share in the resource,
and the steelhead on the reservation migrated upriver off the reservation so that fish on the reservation were part of this shared resource. 249
The Court noted that the Indians could, in theory, take all of the fish
on-reservation, and leave none to migrate beyond the reservation's
boundaries.2 50 This would conflict with the treaty, by allowing the
Indians to take more than their fairly apportioned share of off-reservation fish.2 51 The Court also found that the state had an important
conservation interest in preserving fish stocks. 25 2 Carefully noting that
Washington was not trying to allocate the catch among the Indians,
but was only setting an overall limit on the fish taken by tribal members, 253 the Court upheld the state's limit. The case, however, must be
read carefully, recognizing that it turns on the uniquely shared treaty
right to a migratory fish resource.
3. Preemption analysis for tribal hunting regulation in Alaska.
The discussion will now apply this preemption analysis to determine
whether implementation of tribal codes would preempt state game
laws on Indian country in Alaska. Federal laws will first be examined
to determine whether they support or undercut the exercise of state
jurisdiction. Then the competing state and tribal interests will be
outlined.
a. Statutory analysis. Since very few tribes in Alaska have enacted regulatory schemes, the courts have had no chance to assess
whether federal law supports or undercuts exclusive tribal jurisdiction,
246.
at 395.
247.
248.
249.

Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132 (1854), quoted in Puyallup I, 391 U.S.
391 U.S. at 399.
414 U.S. at 48-49.
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165,

175-77 (1977) (Puyallup III).
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

176.
176-77
177.
178.
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using modem preemption analysis. 254 Thus, no statute can automatically be excluded from consideration and, therefore, several must be
analyzed.

i. Public Law 280. Congress passed Public Law 280255 in 1953 to
deal with a situation of "lawlessness" that was perceived to exist on

reservations where weak or impoverished tribes were unable to pro-

vide effective tribal justice systems.25 6 The primary object of this stat-

ute, which only applies to specified reservations and Indian country in
specified states, including Alaska, was to subject Native Americans in
those Indian country areas to state criminal law. 257 The statute, how-

ever, also gives state courts jurisdiction over "civil causes of action" in
those Indian country areas and declares that "civil laws.., of general
application to private persons or private property shall have the same

force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere
within the State.

' 258

Bryan v. Itasca County2 59 held that the provision

concerning civil jurisdiction was intended only to provide Indians with
a forum for resolving legal disputes. 260 The Supreme Court in that
case held that Public Law 280 subjected those specified Indian country
lands to state criminal but not state regulatory laws. 26 1 Cases since
Bryan have clarified this distinction between criminal laws that do apply on specified Indian country areas and regulatory laws that do not.
Criminal laws are those which completely outlaw a given activity,

while regulatory laws restrict262the terms and conditions under which
that activity may take place.
254. There are some decisions from before the modem era considering the extent
of territorial governmental jurisdiction over Alaska Natives. For a discussion of these
cases see RURAL ALASKA COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM, INC., TOWARD UNDERSTANDING: A POSITIVE VIEW OF FEDERAL-STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS 54-65 (Mar.
1986). None of these cases employed modem preemption analysis, and thus their
continued validity can be questioned.
255. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982).
256. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976).
257. Id. at 380.
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982).
259. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
260. Id. at 383.
261. Id. at 380-82.
262. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 55 U.S.L.W. 4225 (U.S. Feb.
25, 1987); Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694
F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983); Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982);
see also United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977) (interpreting the
Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1982), a federal statute that makes violations
of state law a federal crime if committed in federal enclaves, including Indian
reservations).
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Under Public Law 280 it is irrelevant whether the state chooses to
use punitive penalties designated as "criminal" or to assess compensatory "civil" fines. Public Law 280's distinction between criminal and
regulatory does not turn on the nature or purpose of the penalty used
in enforcement actions. Thus, for instance, a state law providing criminal fines for violations of restrictions on bingo operations would be
operations are
"regulatory" under Public Law 280 as long as bingo
2 63
allowed in some circumstances but not in others.
Public Law 280 does not grant the state jurisdiction to apply state
regulatory laws in Indian country. Under Public Law 280's distinction between regulatory laws and criminal laws, hunting laws clearly
qualify as "regulatory" in spite of the criminal nature of the penalties
2
that the state chooses to impose for certain hunting violations.
Thus, Public Law 280 does not give the state jurisdiction over hunting
in Alaska Indian country.
ii. ANCSA. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
("ANCSA") 2 65 culminated one stage in the struggle for protection of
Alaska Native interests. In the 1960s, Native claims in Alaska based
on aboriginal title had not been litigated, but it appeared that Natives
would be able to establish aboriginal title rights to most, if not all, of
the state.2 66 To meet the "immediate need for a fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska, based on
aboriginal land claims," and to accomplish that settlement "rapidly,
with certainty, [and] in conformity with the real economic and social
2 67
needs of Natives, without litigation," Congress enacted ANCSA.
This legislation accomplished two important tasks: (1) it extinguished
all claims to Alaska lands based on aboriginal title; and (2) it granted
money and land selection rights to a set of corporations established
pursuant to the Act, the stock of which is held by Natives throughout
the state. 268
263. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4227.
264. The Ninth Circuit has discussed the applicability of Public Law 280 to hunting regulations. In United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth
Circuit contrasted that case, involving possession of fireworks with "other regulatory
schemes such as hunting or fishing where a person who wants to hunt or fish merely
has to pay a fee and obtain a license." Id. at 1364.
265. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982).
266. For a history of the efforts to establish Native claims based on aboriginal title
before the passage of ANCSA, see United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F.
Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977), aff'd, 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.

888 (1980).
267. 43 U.S.C. § 2(a), (b) (1982).
268. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982). The stock of the corporations cannot be sold
to non-Natives for 20 years from the date of the Act. Id. §§ 1606(h), 1607(c).

266
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Congress chose to give settlement lands and monies to these corporations, rather than to Alaska Native tribal governments. It did so,
not to affect the powers of tribal governments, but to ensure that all
Natives, irrespective of the tribes to which they belong or the villages
in which they reside, share equitably the revenues produced from these

lands. 269 The fact that tribes are not owners of lands given in the settlement, however, does not automatically usurp tribes' governmental
rights to regulate the use of those lands,
nor does it automatically
270

mean that state law can apply there.

ANCSA cannot be read as a repudiation of tribal sovereignty in

Alaska. The statute neither addresses tribal sovereignty, nor does it
contain the explicit language that the courts require to effect a revoca-

tion of Indian rights under the canons for construction of Indian stat-

utes. 27 1 On the contrary, section 2(c) of ANCSA states that:
[N]o provision of this Act shall replace or diminish any right, privilege, or obligation of Natives as citizens of the United States or of
Alaska, or relieve, replace, or diminish any obligation of the United
States or of the State of Alaska to protect and promote the rights272
or
welfare of Natives as citizens of the United States or of Alaska.
Moreover, as federal policy has shifted towards strengthening tribal

government in the last fifteen years, statutes since ANCSA uniformly
have extended to Alaskan tribal councils the same benefits and powers
269. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601(b), 1606(i), 1606G) (1982); see also H.R. No. 92-523, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2192, 2198-99 (1971) ("Although
twelve regional corporations are contemplated, a substantial portion of the funds received by them must be passed on to the village level. Moreover, the funds used at the
village level must be used for the benefit of all residents of the Village.").
270. See supra text accompanying notes 206-53. Thus, for instance, in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983), state hunting bag limits were
preempted, even as applied to non-Indian deer hunting on tribally owned lands, while
in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the tribe was not allowed to regulate non-Indian fishing on Indian country lands that were not tribally owned absent a
showing of important tribal interests at stake. Thus, tribal land ownership can factor
heavily in the interest analysis portion of tribal preemption analysis. Alaska tribes can
easily meet Montana's required showing of such important tribal interests, given the
importance of subsistence to village residents' cultural heritage and economic survival.
Cf Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (Crow Indians not so dependent on fishing that nonIndian fishing would threaten tribe's political or economic security so as to justify
tribal regulation). Such a showing would, however, complicate the subject matter preemption analysis for an exercise of tribal sovereignty on these non-tribal lands.
271. Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, No. A82-369, slip op. at 9 (D. Alaska
Dec. 3, 1986) (ANCSA did not change status of Native village tribal government or
alter its powers); Village of Akiachak v. Notti, No. A85-503 Civ., slip op. at 3 (D.
Alaska 1986) (decision on preliminary injunction) (village tribal governments qualify
as Indian tribes who can sue in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1362); cf Menominee
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (refusing to construe
statute as a backhanded way of abrogating hunting and fishing rights).
272. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(c) (1982).
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as have been given to Indian tribes. For example, the Indian Financing Act of 1974,273 the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, 274 the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 275 and

the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,276 each define "Indian tribe" as
including any Native villages, groups, or corporations as defined in
ANCSA. Through these statutes and ANCSA, Congress clearly is
promoting the sovereignty and self-determination of Native Alaskans.
Indeed, the tribal governments are even treated as sovereign states for
federal tax purposes. 277 In this context, it is clear that ANCSA did
not constitute a repudiation of Alaska tribal sovereign powers or a
grant of state jurisdiction over ANCSA corporation lands.
In fact, section 21(d) of ANCSA, by negative implication, supports a finding that state law is preempted on ANCSA corporation
lands. This section, dealing with the taxation of corporation lands,
provides:
Real property interests conveyed, pursuant to this [Act], to a Native
...Corporation ...which are not developed or leased to third
parties... shall be exempt from State or local property taxes for a
period of twenty years from the vesting of title pursuant to
[ANILCA] or the date of issuance of an interim conveyance or pat278
ent, whichever is earlier ....
This section gives the state limited jurisdiction over ANCSA corporation lands: the state may impose property taxes on the lands once
twenty years have passed after the corporation receives title. But the
power to tax is not equivalent to the power to regulate. Neither section 21(d) nor any other section of ANCSA grants the state regulatory
jurisdiction over such Indian country lands after twenty years or at
any time. By negative implication, then, state regulations are preempted on ANCSA lands.
In enacting ANCSA, Congress in no way intended to impair tribal rights. Although at first blush section 2(b) seems to contain some
anti-tribal sentiments, a closer scrutiny reveals that it does not. Section 2(b) provides: "the settlement should be accomplished... without establishing any permanent racially defined institutions, rights,
privileges, or obligations, without creating a reservation system or
lengthy wardship or trusteeship. '279 The canons for construction of
Indian statutes require that any statute extinguishing Indian rights
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982).
Id. § 450-450n (1982).
Id. §§ 1601-1680 (1982).
Id. §§ 1901-1963 (1982).
Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (1982).
43 U.S.C. § 1620(d)(1) (1982).
Id. § 1601(b) (1982).
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must do so explicitly. 280 It is, therefore, especially important to focus
clearly on the specific language of this section.
Section 2(b) addresses only the effect of the settlement. It discusses how Congress intends a settlement to be carried out for claims
based on Alaska Natives' aboriginal title rights. It says nothing about
institutions or rights (such as rights to tribal sovereign government),
which Alaska Natives may have independent of, or in addition to, any
aboriginal land rights. It is a statement only about institutions, rights,
privileges, or obligations established by ANCSA. Tribes and tribal
powers were not established by ANCSA - they predate the settlement. The statute does not state that any existing institutions, rights,
privileges, or obligations are altered or abolished.
The statement in section 2(b) that the settlement should not establish any "permanent racially defined institutions" in no way affects
'28 1
tribal rights or powers. Tribal rights are not "racially defined."
The Supreme Court has made clear that tribal membership is a political, not a racial, status.2 82 This status is rooted in the federal trust
responsibility, which creates a special relationship between the federal
government and tribes.

283

The statement that the settlement should not create a "reservation system, ' 284 does not impair tribal powers either. Reservations are
established by treaty, executive agreement confirmed by statute, or by
executive withdrawal, setting aside land held by the United States in
trust for the tribe. As one kind of Indian country, it is land over
which the tribe has limited sovereign powers. On a reservation, a tribe
280. See supra notes 189-205 and accompanying text.
281. D. CASE, supra note 36, at 17.
282. Washington v. Washington State Comm. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). In ANCSA, Congress defined the class of people who
would receive stock and other benefits under the statute in racial terms - in terms of
a quantum of Alaska Native blood - in order quickly and definitively to define the
recipient class. Thus, this statement in section 2(b) that the settlement should not
create permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations must
refer to the fact that restrictions on stock lift after 20 years.
283. See supra notes 115-30 and accompanying text.
284. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1982). Other sections of ANCSA also state that Congress did not intend ANCSA lands to be reservation lands. Section 2(g) of ANCSA
states that the term "Indian reservation" shall include ANCSA lands only for the
purpose of federal loan and grant programs. Id. § 1601(g). The legislative history of
this section clarifies that, "[t]he lands granted by this Act are not 'in trust' and the
Native villages are not Indian 'reservations'." S. REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
40 (1971). Thus, Congress did not wish ANCSA corporation lands to be subject to
the same oversight and restrictions on alienation as tribal trust lands. This language,
however, does not say that Native villages are not Indian country, only that they do
not qualify under the "reservation" branch of the three-way test for Indian country.
Cf supra text at notes 132-34.
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has a certain amount of authority as the predominant, and sometimes
nearly exclusive, landowner, while at the same time it possesses other
powers as a government with jurisdiction over the same land. Since
ANCSA is land settlement legislation, this language about a "reservation system" refers only to Congress' decision that ANCSA lands
would not be held in trust for the Natives, but rather, would be given
free of trust restrictions in fee to the corporations. Furthermore, since
ANCSA addresses land ownership patterns and does not discuss tribal
sovereignty issues, this statement cannot be read as a blanket congressional statement that Alaska tribal governments should not have the
sovereign powers that lower forty-eight tribes have on their
reservations.
Section 2(b) also states that the settlement should be accom2 85
plished without "creating ... a lengthy wardship or trusteeship."
This language too refers to Congress' choice to give settlement lands to
ANCSA corporations in fee, rather than setting aside lands in trust for
tribal governments. The fact that this language refers to trusteeship
with regard to lands, rather than any other aspect of the federal trust
relationship with Alaska Natives, is clarified in section 2(c) of
ANCSA. That section states that ANCSA does not affect any of the
federal government's trust responsibilities to Natives. 286 Since section
2(c) reaffirms federal trust responsibilities, which include the responsibility to protect tribal governments from state encroachment, the language in section 2(b) barring creation of a lengthy wardship or
trusteeship must be understood as referring to Congress' decision that
settlement lands will be held in fee and not in trust.
Thus, upon careful reading, it is clear that neither section 2(b) nor
any other section of ANCSA limits or abolishes tribal sovereign powers in Alaska. ANCSA was enacted solely for the purpose of settling
title to these lands. The only jurisdiction granted to the state by this
Act is the power to tax ANCSA lands. Because ANCSA does not
grant regulatory powers to the state, by negative implication, ANCSA
supports a finding that state law is preempted as to ANCSA lands.
In sum, in ANCSA, Congress chose not to cede settlement lands
to tribal governments, thus withholding from Alaskan tribal governments the power that automatically would follow from making them
major landowners. The statute does not, however, contain any clear
285. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1982).
286. Section 2(c) reads: "[N]o provision of this Chapter shall replace or diminish
... any obligation of the United States ... to protect and promote the rights and
welfare of Natives . . . ." 43 U.S.C. § 1601(c) (1982). This clearly refers to federal
trust responsibilities to Natives, because the statute goes on to direct a report from the
Secretary of the Interior to Congress on "all Federal programs primarily designed to
benefit Native people.... ." Id. Programs primarily designed to benefit Native Americans involve the federal trust responsibility.
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statement limiting or abolishing tribal sovereign powers in Alaska.
Nor does it grant the state jurisdiction over such lands. Furthermore,
by negative implication, section 21(d) of ANCSA may support a finding that state law is preempted.
iii. ANILCA. Title VIII of ANILCA provides that the State of
Alaska will be allowed to manage fish and game on public lands only if
the state passes "laws of general applicability" guaranteeing certain
protections for subsistence. 287 The statute thus contemplates that
game will be managed under state law on public lands, if the state can
meet the terms set in ANILCA. Public lands, however, are clearly
defined in section 102(3) of ANILCA as federally owned lands 28 8 and
do not include private Native allotments or ANCSA lands. Thus, title
VIII does not grant the state any right to manage game on these Indian country lands. In fact, by affirming state game management powers on federal lands but not on non-federal Indian country lands, the
statute can be read as undercutting, by negative implication, the state's
2 89
jurisdictional claims.
This provision in title VIII of ANILCA has negative implications
that are similar to the negative implications in the Arizona Enabling
Act relied on by the Supreme Court in McClanahan. In that case, the
Court found state taxes could not apply to Navajos living on the reservation, because the Arizona Enabling Act stated only that the state
could tax Indians off the reservation. 290 This provision in the Arizona
Enabling Act is parallel to title VIII of ANILCA, which similarly allows the state to regulate on some non-Indian country lands, but
which is silent about whether state law can be applied on Indian country lands.
Furthermore, tribal jurisdiction over hunting is consistent with
the spirit of title VIII. In ANILCA, Congress expressed reservations
about the state's desire or ability to protect subsistence adequately.
These reservations made it necessary to set certain conditions on state
management to protect subsistence. Congress built into title VIII provisions, such as fish and game advisory committees, regional councils,
287. 16 U.S.C. § 3115(d) (1982). The protections for subsistence include giving
subsistence a priority over other consumptive uses of fish and game and implementing
the local advisory committee and regional council system. See supra note 43.

288. 16 U.S.C. § 3102(3) (1982).
289. Nor does the statute's statement that state management will proceed under
"laws of general applicability" mean that the State of Alaska has jurisdiction over
Indian country lands. Even state laws of general applicability do not reach lands over
which the state does not have jurisdiction, such as Indian country lands. Thus, state
game laws can be laws of general applicability without reaching Indian country, and
title VIII does not recognize state jurisdiction over hunting on nonfederally owned
Indian country lands.
290. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1973).
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and subsistence resource commissions, 29 1 to ensure involvement by rural residents in writing hunting regulations applicable to subsistence.
Tribal jurisdiction is merely another tool for village residents to gain
such local control and thus is completely consistent with the statute.
In conclusion, the State of Alaska can find no support in Public
Law 280, ANCSA, or ANILCA for applying its hunting regulations
on ANCSA corporation lands. In fact, by negative implication, section 21(d) of ANCSA and section 805 of ANILCA support exclusive
tribal jurisdiction and the preemption of state law.
b. Interest analysis. The second part of the tribal preemption
292
test, examining the tribal, federal, and state interests at stake,
strongly supports tribal jurisdiction. As section II has shown, subsistence hunting is critical to the economic and cultural survival of remote Native villages. 2 93 Furthermore, given that the needs and values
of Native subsistence hunters differ substantially from those of sport
hunters, local tribal control becomes important to achieve culturally
appropriate rules for subsistence hunters. 294 The state also has interests to weigh in the balance, since many subsistence resources migrate
beyond the boundaries of Indian country. This interest, which might
justify a state overall limit on tribal take of game, 295 would never,
however, justify state involvement in allocating the take or restricting
hunting methods and means of village members.
This discussion illustrates that plausible arguments can be made
to show state game laws are preempted in Alaska Indian country. As
the reader can see, however, it is difficult to be sure how the courts will
construe the applicable statutes, especially given the uncertainties inherent in the canons for construction of statues affecting Native American rights. Given the political heat swirling around this issue, surely
none of the parties involved will agree to any resolution short of
litigation.
291. 16 U.S.C. § 3118 (1982). There is a commission for each national park or
monument where subsistence is permitted. These commissions, which must include
some members who engage in subsistence in the park or monument, are to draw up a
program for subsistence hunting within the park or monument, and to submit it to the
Department of the Interior. Id. § 3118(a). Interior can only reject the program for
certain specified reasons. Id. § 3118(b).
292. See supra at notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
293. See supra at notes 2-37 and accompanying text.
294. For tribes to assert jurisdiction over hunting by non-tribal members, such a
showing will be necessary. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
295. Cf Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165
(1977) (Puyallup III). Unlike the State of Washington in Puyallup Il, however, the
State of Alaska cannot point to any provision of federal law supporting such an exercise of state jurisdiction. Without such statutory support, the state's interest in limiting tribal game take would be insufficient to meet the tribal preemption test.
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CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE OPERATION OF TRIBAL
HUNTING CODES

The beginning of this article discussed the subsistence needs of
rural Native villages and the ways in which current state game management fails to respond to those needs. 296 This discussion showed
why villagers are unhappy with the status quo and are likely to push
for change. Change can occur on two fronts: state game management
can be reformed to make it more sensitive, responsive, and adaptive to
village needs; or as sections III and IV of this article suggest, the villages can choose to opt out of state game management by adopting
tribal game codes.
There are several factors inducing villages to try reforming the
state system, rather than striking out on their own with tribal regulations. 297 Writing and enforcing tribal game codes will require mobilizing resources that these small communities may find daunting.
Implementing such systems also will involve substantial legal uncertainty. Assuming that the state will resist such efforts, Native villages
that choose to write and enforce tribal game codes will need to be
prepared for extensive litigation to clarify jurisdictional issues. Village
hunters must have the courage to stick by their tribal rules in spite of
state enforcement efforts while the legality of these regulations is being
contested in the courts.
Simultaneous efforts to reform state game management and to
implement tribal game codes are not necessarily inconsistent village
strategies. Most likely, some villages will pursue one route while other
Native communities explore alternative approaches. 298 Some villages
will be more militant than others, but even the most passive will watch
the efforts of more active communities with great interest.
Efforts to reform the state's management system are already
under way. Such reform efforts rely heavily on litigation brought to
296. See supra section II.
297. It is important that the promises of tribal hunting jurisdiction not be oversold
in the villages. As the above legal analysis shows, there are many uncertainties about
tribal hunting jurisdiction. If the State of Alaska resists the idea of tribal hunting
regulation vigorously, jurisdictional disputes could be bogged down in the courts for
decades. Even if tribal advocates win such court battles, tribal rights are not as unlimited as the commonly misused term "sovereignty" implies. Tribes may not be able to
establish Indian country jurisdiction over anywhere near all the lands they have traditionally used for subsistence.
298. For instance, the Village of Gambell has been working on drafting a village
walrus hunting ordinance. Telephone interview with James Bamberger, Alaska Legal
Services Corporation, Anchorage Statewide Office (1986). Simultaneously, Native
leaders in Kotzebue, through their local fish and game advisory committee, are trying
to get the Board of Game to review its regulations for compatibility with the needs of
subsistence hunters in Northwest Alaska. REGULATION REVIEW, supra note 83.
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obtain compliance with the guarantees of ANILCA's subsistence provisions. The controversy over passage of the new subsistence hunting
law showed that subsistence cannot obtain protection in the state's
political arena, given the dominance of sport hunting interests there.
Litigation is already testing state compliance with ANILCA's substantive requirement for a real subsistence priority. 29 9 Further reform efforts could focus on the potential for improving state compliance with
ANILCA's procedural requirements for effective local fish and game
3
advisory committees and regional councils. 00
To some degree, village success in reforming state game management may diffuse pressure for tribal game management systems.
Given the tremendous effort that would be necessary to implement
tribal game codes, villages might not try this approach if state game
regulations begin better to fit village needs. On the other hand, the
State of Alaska, responding to the very real political clout of state
sport hunters, may find ways to resist or delay reform efforts. Such
resistance will only increase pressure in the villages to opt out of the
state management system and increase the likelihood that Alaska,
sooner or later, will see the implementation of tribal hunting codes. If,
as this article suggests, the courts uphold tribal codes as preemptive of
state game law on Indian country, Alaska will have to make its peace
with tribal hunting regulation.
Many readers may find the thought of Native hunting regulation
disquieting. Bad publicity in the urban press about Native game violations leads many to believe that Native hunters cannot be trusted to
conserve game. Yet, several cooperative regulatory schemes placing
substantial responsibility on Native hunters are already in place in
Alaska. The federal government is undertaking formal cooperative
299. See, e.g., Bobby v. State, No. A84-544 (D. Alaska). A full discussion of the
complexities of the subsistence priority is beyond the scope of this article.
300. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:223

management for bowhead whales 30 1 and migratory birds. 30 2 Both ef-

forts have not always proceeded smoothly, 30 3 but on the whole have
been successful from a conservation standpoint. 3°4 In addition, the
federal government, in managing marine mammals, has not found it
necessary to implement such controls as bag limits, seasons, or restrictions on methods of hunting to keep Native subsistence take at accept-

able levels. 305 In effect, since only the use of marine mammal products
is restricted3 0 6 and not the amount of the take, the government is rely-

ing, in large part, on the conservation values of Native hunters enforced through traditional law to manage marine mammal resources

such as polar bears, seals, walruses, and beluga whales.
There are, however, some very real practical problems in implementing a checkerboarded system of state and tribal jurisdiction. Borders of ANCSA corporation lands run in straight lines across the map,
not following any natural features. They are unmarked, and most
hunters have no idea where those borders are located. Both migratory
animals and the hunters pursuing them are likely to cross between

Indian country lands and lands under state jurisdiction. If tribal and
state rules diverge widely, hunters on the land will have to know the

exact location of boundaries to determine which code applies. Similarly, in any enforcement actions the prosecution will also need to be
301. 50 C.F.R. §§ 230.70-.77 (1986). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has a Cooperative Agreement with the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission ("AEWC"), a group of Eskimo whaling captains. Id. § 230.70. Each year the
International Whaling Commission sets a limit on the number of bowhead whales
which can be taken by Alaska Native whalers for subsistence. The United States has
agreed that the Whaling Commission will allocate the extremely limited number of
whales among the bowhead whaling villages. The AEWC also monitors and has the
primary responsibility for enforcement of the quotas. See S. LANGDON, ALASKAN
NATIVE SUBSISTENCE: CURRENT REGULATORY REGIMES AND IssuES 38-47 (prepared for Alaskan Native Review Commission, 1984). The federal government also
relies on the North Slope Borough's census of bowhead whales for biological information necessary to its management program. Interview with Tom Albert, North Slope
Borough (1985).
302. Alaska Fish and Wildlife Fed'n & Outdoor Council, Inc. v. Jantzen, 13 Indian
L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3023 (D. Alaska 1986).
303. D. BOERI, supra note 5, at 103-11, 274-80 (whales); S. LANGDON, supra note
301, at 42-47 (whales), 48-53 (migratory birds).
304. For a history of the AEWC through 1984, see S. LANGDON, supra note 301 at
3847. The system of cooperative management with the AEWC for bowhead whales
has been sufficiently successful that the federal government has not felt any need to
abandon the arrangement. Similarly, the cooperative system of management for migratory birds has won praise from environmentalists participating in the process. Laycock, Doing What's Rightfor the Geese, 8, AUDUBON Nov. 1985, at 118.
305. 50 C.F.R. § 18.23 (1986). The regulations restricting the take of bowhead
whales constitute the sole exception. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 230.70-.77 (1986).
306. Id.
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able to prove exactly where a purported game violation occurred. Ideally, state and tribal game laws should track, so that hunters would
not be subject to differing rules on either side of jurisdictional bounda30 7
ries. Game management will be immensely difficult unless tribes
and the state can sit down to work out consistent regulations and coordinated enforcement systems. Given these strong inducements to
achieving uniform state and tribal rules, the end result of the tribal
sovereignty movement in the area of hunting, may ultimately be joint
state and village management under rules acceptable to both.
In spite of the legal uncertainty surrounding tribal game regulations, limited geographic extent of tribal jurisdiction, and practical enforcement difficulties created by checkerboarded jurisdictional
domains, tribes still may find efforts to write their own hunting codes a
valuable exercise. 30 8 The threat of tribal hunting regulation may be
the only way to get the State of Alaska to pay attention to village
needs. A serious threat of losing state control over the regulatory process, even if only for limited areas of land, may force the state to take
some measures to make its game management more palatable to
villagers.

307. Adjacent villages may also want to work together to write consistent codes
based on their shared traditions.
308. The process of deciding on a tribal game code may also have value to the
village as a means of examining and reaffirming traditional hunting values. See supra
p. 230.

